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ABSTRACT 
Scholars and practitioners alike have recently pointed to the idea of a “new 
moment” in the field of law and economic development, as well as a hope for a 
fruitful rethinking of political economy.  The idea is that we have passed out of the 
period of high “neoliberalism,” associated at one time with Reagan, Thatcher, 
and the so-called Washington Consensus and now eclipsed by the ascendance of 
the Obama Administration.  The hope attending the new consensus is that, in the 
wake of neoliberal law and policy, the field of law and development might be on 
the verge of a new round of experimental work going beyond the old patterns of 
“free competition—state intervention” discourse.  This Article affirms the notion 
of a new moment, but is pessimistic about its meaning.  After surveying two 
phases in the intellectual history of global law and development, the Article turns 
to what Duncan Kennedy has described as the “third globalization,” a statement 
on the characteristic qualities of contemporary legal thought.  In setting out these 
qualities, I argue that they constitute a form of legal pragmatism that is both new 
and illustrative of our present condition.  As for what this pragmatism means in 
terms of providing a post-neoliberal direction for law and development, the 
argument surveys the current exchange between two rival forms of pragmatic 
governance: minimalism and experimentalism.  The conclusion is darker than we 
might like: although there does indeed seem reason to believe in a new turn 
towards problem-solving in the field of economic development, it is a turn in 
which our legal pragmatism too often promotes the old discursive patterns from 
which we had hoped to escape.  
 
 
  Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am thankful for some general 
comments on a prior version of this Article I received from Amy Cohen, David Kennedy, and Brian 
Tamanaha. This Article is an expanded version of an essay first published as Experimental 
Pragmatism in the Third Globalization, 9 CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM (2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The major claim in this Article is that the field of law and economic 
development is helpfully understood in the light of an alliance between 
―liberal legalism‖1 and ―legal pragmatism.‖2 Building off of Duncan 
Kennedy‘s suggestion that much (if not all) of American Legal Thought is 
constituted through a series of globalizing forms of legal consciousness,
3
 
the present argument holds that the current situation of the law and 
development field is shaped by the confluence of two elements. On the 
one hand, law and development practitioners work from a playbook that is 
largely an assemblage of artifacts left over from prior moments in the 
history of liberal legalism. The two basic pieces in the assembly include a 
neoformalist commitment to the Rule of Law, and a neofunctionalist 
 
 
 1. For a discussion of liberal legalism in the sense that I am here suggesting see Justin 
Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 387 (2012) and Justin Desautels-
Stein, Liberal Legalism and the Two State Action Doctrines, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. (forthcoming 
2012). 
 2. Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary 
Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565 (2007). 
 3. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
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commitment to balancing techniques that purport to mediate conflicting 
considerations. On the other hand, law and development practitioners are 
committed to a pragmatic, ―problem-solving‖ approach that sees itself as 
―freestanding‖4 of ideological relationships with particular worldviews. 
Thus, unlike the lawyer of bygone days who understood herself to see law 
as managing a fairly crisp line between market and state, or a law which 
had as its function the production of social welfare with little interest in 
the line between market and state, today‘s pragmatic lawyer believes in 
neither of these images of liberal law. She only believes in the pragmatic 
necessity of shifting between the images as the situation demands, 
enabling a fluidity in the quest for solving problems. 
Of course, there are different sorts of problem-solving, and in the fields 
of regulation and economic development, there are two obvious 
candidates. On the one side is the ―minimalism‖ of certain forms of 
behavioral economics, sometimes associated with the likes of Cass 
Sunstein and the ―nudge.‖5 On the other side is the experimentalism of 
―new governance‖ theorists like Charles Sabel and William Simon.6 In this 
Article, I situate these new forms of legal pragmatism in the context of 
Kennedy‘s story of legal thought, and my own take on liberal legalism. 
Like many scholars of the moment, I agree that global thinking about 
market-state relations in the development discourse has reached a new 
position, albeit a deeply troubled one. In contrast to the hope that 
pragmatism might triumph over formalism,
7
 for example, I see the new 
pragmatism as enabling formalism instead of disarming it, and broadening 
the blind spots of law and economics, instead of shrinking them.  
In order to see how this happens, it is necessary to layer over Duncan 
Kennedy‘s excellent architecture a story of liberalism and pragmatism and 
the manner in which legal pragmatism has splintered in the context of 
contemporary legal thought. Taking notice of this splintering is crucial, 
since some forms of pragmatism are busily entrenching the stock defaults 
of liberal legalism, while others at least have an intention of displacing, if 
not dispensing them.  
In the discussion that follows, I introduce Duncan Kennedy‘s three 
styles of legal thought, and place them in the context of liberal legalism 
 
 
 4. Thomas Grey, Freestanding Legal Prgamatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1996). 
 5. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.  
 6. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the 
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming 
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004). 
 7. David Trubek, ―The Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 3, at 74, 93. 
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and development economics. In particular, I suggest that legal pragmatism 
provides an effective way of understanding how liberal legalism has been 
disaggregated and reassembled in contemporary legal thought, and 
examine the rise and fall of neoliberalism as illustrating two parts of our 
present legal pragmatism. That is, instead of seeing two periods of 
disenchantment—one after the 1970s and another in the early 21st 
century—I argue that what emerged after 1970 was a single form of legal 
consciousness that incorporates both a vital neoformalism as well as a 
chastened one. The discussion concludes with a brief look at two forms of 
legal pragmatism: ―minimalism‖ and ―experimentalism.‖ Taking the 
recent work of Charles Sabel and William Simon as illustrative of the 
experimentalist position, the analysis first asks whether their brand of 
experimental pragmatism is ―contemporary‖ in Duncan Kennedy‘s sense 
of the word, and if so, whether it might provide the sort of regulatory 
apparatus David Kennedy has in mind for a new, heterogenous alliance.
8
  
My answers are only preliminary, and will hopefully be the starting 
point in further work. If we are looking for a conceptual bottom line here, 
perhaps it can be said that a genuinely experimental style of problem-
solving embraces a single proposition: the liberal narrative of ―market and 
state‖ should be displaced in favor of a counter-narrative which asks 
―which market‖ and ―which state‖?9 Or, to put it another way, perhaps 
experimentalism might be stretched to oppose the traditional images of 
liberal legalism by dismissing the idea that any particular agent—whether 
that be a centralized government agency or the World Bank and IMF or a 
particular recipe of private law rights—can see the future of economic 
development and offer instructions for how to get there.
10
  
 
 
 8. David Kennedy, Law and Development Economics: Toward a New Alliance (2011) (on file 
with author). For contrasting views, see, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilock, The 
Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 
(2008); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 44 
CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 209 (2011); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, 1–33 
(Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No. 30, 2002), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ 
2002/09/10/mythmaking-in-rule-of-law-orthodoxy/47s4. 
 9. Sanjay Reddy, Beyond the State Versus Market, 40 DEVELOPMENT 7 (1997); see also 
ROBERTO M. UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED (2007); Charles Sabel, Bootstrapping Development: 
Rethinking the Role of Public Intervention in Promoting Growth (Nov. 14, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm; David M. Trubek, 
Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of Development and 
Law 1–34 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1075, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349163.  
 10. Charles Sabel & Sanjay Reddy, Learning to Learn: Undoing the Gordian Knot of 
Development Today, 50 CHALLENGE 73, 74 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
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In terms of what defines the content of an experimental style of 
development economics, it‘s difficult to pinpoint in the absence of a 
concrete problem to solve. To do otherwise might, as Sanjay Reddy has 
suggested, undermine an appreciation of the ―enormous and perhaps 
inexhaustible constellation of yet unrealized possibilities‖ about the shape 
of a democratized market economy.
11
 After all, experimentalists don‘t 
believe in the possibility of being guided by right propositions, since 
propositions can only be tested for their merit in the heat of actual 
experiences in the here and now. As Reddy and Sabel have cautioned, it is 
best to consider an experimental approach ―not as an effort to lay 
foundation stones of a new cathedral of development thinking, but rather 
as an offering in the bazaar of collaborative work on a theme that concerns 
us all.‖12 For example, one vision of a democratized market economy 
might be  
characterized by the overcoming of segmentation and 
subordination. It would favor deconcentration and delegation over 
centralization of function and authority. It would distribute widely 
the fruits of ownership as well as the privileges of control. It would 
seek as primary ends full employment and the inclusion of the 
excluded in the productive life of society. . . . Simultaneously, such 
an economy would not be predicated on the sacrifice of material 
prosperity, but rather would seek out areas of overlap between 
material enhancement and the realization of democratic ends. 
Finally, such an economy should strive to assure that the 
conceptions of collective identity and of democratic possibility and 
responsibility, in relation to which it gains life, do not end at 
arbitrary boundaries, including those of the nation.
13
 
As Sabel and Simon have argued, the experimentalist style of 
administration is happening. Still in its infancy, it may be too soon to 
judge much of its work, but at least in the United States and the European 
Union, experimental pragmatism is hard at work. A next phase in the 
research agenda should take a cue from these developments, and 
interrogate the possibilities of a nascent experimentalism in the developing 
world.   
 
 
 11. Reddy, supra note 9, at 8. 
 12. Sabel & Reddy, supra note 10, at 76. 
 13. Reddy, supra note 9, at 9. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. TWO MODES OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
A. The First Globalization: Classical Legal Thought 
In Duncan Kennedy‘s map of American Legal Thought, a notion of 
―legal consciousness‖ is framed in the language of semiotics, where a 
consciousness is comprised of langue and parole.
14
 The langue provides 
the fundamental elements of the consciousness—its mode of reasoning, its 
conceptual vocabulary, and the like. In contrast is parole, which consists 
in the actual speech-acts, the legal arguments themselves that are spoken 
in the mode of the langue. Thus, while parole is relatively indeterminate 
within the context of the structure of the langue, the langue itself is 
identifiable as a discrete set of ideas. According to Kennedy, the langue of 
classical legal thought (―CLT‖) is a combination of three big ideas: 
(1) individualism, (2) a strict separation of the private sphere of the 
common law rules from the public sphere of coercive state regulation, and 
(3) a strategy of judicial interpretation known rather infamously as 
formalism.
15
 Taken together, Kennedy described the basic mode of 
reasoning in CLT as ―the will theory,‖16 which I might also characterize as 
a distillation of classic liberal legalism.
17
  
To get a feel for this style, it might be helpful to recall John Locke‘s 
argument about property rights and freedom of contract in his Second 
Treatise of Government.
18
 In Locke‘s version of the state of nature, 
individuals enjoyed certain natural rights as a matter of their membership 
 
 
 14. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147 (2001). More 
generally, see FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert 
Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1986) (1983). 
 15. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 25–36. 
 16. Id. See also ROBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996); 
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller‟s 
“Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment 
of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber‟s Sociology in the Genealogy of the 
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031(2004); David M. Trubek, 
Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 720.  
 17. Though Kennedy did at an earlier point explicitly connect liberalism into his narrative, his 
more recent work avoids any reference to the notion that liberalism plays a role in legal consciousness. 
As a consequence, I should be very clear here that any arguments herein for connections between 
―liberal legalism‖ and Kennedy‘s analysis of legal consciousness are mine alone, and still very 
tentative. For a discussion of liberal legalism in this sense, see Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a 
Legal Concept, supra note 1. 
 18. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689). For classic discussions of 
Locke, see, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962); 
BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1972); ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE 
AND POLITICS (1975). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
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in the human race. These rights were fundamentally about individual 
freedom, and as a consequence, they were rights that clearly distinguished 
the ―individualized‖ human being from the world of Aristotelian political 
animals. Individuals were morally autonomous, subject to no higher 
authority to which they had not consented. In this natural state of free and 
equal individuals, market transactions evolved. Because people have 
natural ownership over their persons, they also have natural ownership 
over the labor their bodies produce. Once that labor is mixed with a good, 
the good logically becomes that individual‘s property. As property-
owners, intelligent individuals tend to buy and sell their goods for a profit.  
Thus, in Locke‘s state of nature things were pretty swell, except for the 
fact that a person‘s property was never really very secure. So, in order to 
actually create a market order, Locke believed it was necessary to legalize 
property and the trade of property, or freedom of contract. As a result, 
Locke argued for a deliverance from the state of nature into a political 
society wherein the chief end of a new constitutional authority would be 
the creation and maintenance of property and contract rights.
19
 
The three elements of Kennedy‘s model of classical legal thought are 
vividly illustrated in this famous little story. The actors are highly 
individualized in the sense that we are working after the major break with 
Aristotelian ideas about the function and purpose of human beings; society 
is split into a private sphere of pre-political (and pre-legal) natural rights 
and a public sphere of arbitrary government and law; the work of jurists in 
the public sphere are tasked with the enforcement of those natural truths 
born in the private sphere but that are only realizable once they have been 
legalized. To be clear, Kennedy is not suggesting that CLT was operating 
as early as the 17th century; in fact he doesn‘t see it as emerging as a 
recognizable style until after the Civil War. With a reign of more than half 
a century, CLT as a form of legal consciousness began its slow decline 
towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, and was finally branded 
gauche by World War II.
20
  
B. The Second Globalization: Social Legal Thought and Development 
Economics 
In contrast to the high individualism of CLT, a new mode of legal 
analysis, which Kennedy calls social legal thought, or ―the social,‖ 
involved a different set of ideas about how to use law as a means for 
 
 
 19. Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra note 1, at 410–23. 
 20. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 37. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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arranging the social world.
21
 The langue of social legal consciousness 
involved ideas about social interdependence, the application of technical 
expertise to the resolution of social problems, a preference for public 
administration over free competition, a wider appreciation of civil and 
political rights, and a judicial strategy of purposive interpretation that 
sought to generate legal conclusions on the basis of perceived social 
needs. Thus, where jurists operating in the CLT style would often seek the 
resolutions of legal disputes via direct deductions from the natural truths 
of the private, pre-political sphere, jurists in the social style would more 
generally look for answers by asking questions about the social function of 
a given legal regime.
22
 Once we knew what a law was supposed to 
accomplish, and when we know whether we wanted it accomplished that 
way, we could only then go on to say whether a legal dispute should be 
resolved in one direction or another.
23
  
In the same way that the langue of CLT might be characterized as a 
classic style of ―liberal legalism‖ à la Locke, the langue of social legal 
consciousness might be characterized as the crystallization of ―modern 
liberalism.‖24 Modern liberal legalism does not have the same sort of 
 
 
 21. Id. at 37–59. 
 22. For two rather different challenges to this story, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE 
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010); Pierre Schlag, Formalism 
and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010). 
 23. There are few limits to the sorts of available examples of the new purposive, instrumentalist, 
functionalist jurisprudence that took off around this time. Perhaps the most famous example is Roscoe 
Pound‘s The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence published in three parts between 1911 
and 1912. 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 489 (1911–1912). For discussion, see 
Julius Stone, Roscoe Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1964–1965). 
 24. Doctrinally, the canonical break with CLT was represented in the overruling of Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In the field 
of theories of capitalism, this shift is well-captured in the writings of thinkers like PAUL BARAN, 
MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966); PAUL BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957); JOHN 
GAILBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1993); ABBA P. 
LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1944). In politics, this 
is captured in the process of the New Deal establishment. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH 
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1998). In law, legal realism probably embodies at least the 
critique of property and contract rights, if not the embrace of the welfare state. For discussion, see 
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE (2001); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (2011). According to Roberto Unger, 
there are three characteristics of the modern liberal style. ―First, its continuing commitment to the 
welfare state and to investment in the people, as both an end in itself and a condition of economic 
success; second, a desire to rid the regulated market economy of statist, corporatist, and oligopolistic 
constraints upon economic flexibility and innovation, especially in the transition to a postfordist style 
of industrial organization, accompanied by sympathy toward bottom-up association and participation 
by people in local government and social organization; and third, an unabashed institutional 
conservatism, expressed in skepticism about large projects of institutional reconstruction and in the 
acceptance of the current legal forms of market economies, representative democracies, and free civil 
societies.‖ UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 16, at 10. Modern 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
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canonical representatives as classic liberalism, but its shortage of 
Olympian authorship is made up for in the staggering breadth of the 
writing that has been done in its service. A likely candidate for the master 
of the modern liberal style is Keynes,
25
 but representatives are available 
from both the left and the right of the Keynesian emphasis on welfarism, 
administration, and employment.
26
 Indeed, Frank Knight, a founding 
member of the Chicago School, and Henry Carter Adams, one of the early 
writers in the first wave of institutional economics, have much in common 
with respect to a new role for law—a role that would stand in deep tension 
with judicial commitments to the will theory.
27
  
Let‘s take two examples of social legal thought, one from the Supreme 
Court and one from the academy. In the Supreme Court‘s 1948 decision in 
Shelley v. Kraemer,
28
 the topic was restrictive covenants: the capacity of 
property owners to prospectively determine to whom their land could, and 
could not, eventually pass. The controversial aspect of these covenants, 
however, was that they excluded the possibility on the basis of race. After 
a black family took ownership of a home that had been subject to a racially 
restrictive covenant, a neighboring family brought an action to enjoin the 
purchasers from taking residence. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed 
with the neighbors and held the covenant to be effective and enforceable. 
In approaching the question, the court was appropriately modest as the 
modern style would indicate: the majority did not hold all private 
agreements to have the color of state action, even though our notions of 
―bargain‖ and ―ownership‖ would be meaningless in the absence of some 
constituting legal regime.
29
 Thus, the division between the independent 
market and the regulating state still held firm: ―[R]estrictive agreements 
standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to 
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of 
 
 
liberalism was just as concerned with economic development as was its classic ancestor, but where the 
classic style was preoccupied with how to establish a legal framework for market society (just as is 
today‘s development practitioner), the modern liberal style was created to deal with the consequences 
of the free competition model. As Roberto Unger has explained, the modern style sought to keep 
―present institutional arrangements while controlling their consequences: by counteracting, 
characteristically, through tax-and-transfer or through preferment for disadvantaged groups, their 
distributive consequences.‖ Id. at 29. See also Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra 
note 1, at 423–44. 
 25. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 57. 
 26. For an interesting discussion of Keynes, Laski, and Hayek, see KENNETH R. HOOVER, 
ECONOMICS AS IDEOLOGY (2003). 
 27. See Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, supra note 1, at 432–44. 
 28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
 29. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 35 
(1976). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it 
would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the 
provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.‖30 That dividing 
line, though it would hold, was nevertheless about to take a beating: ―But 
here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the 
agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of 
the restrictive terms of the agreements.‖31 Voluntary agreements between 
individuals seeking to buy and sell land, the court explained, did not 
implicate the state. The judicial enforcement of those agreements, 
however, did.  
Several beliefs common to social legal thought are here: (1) free 
competition in the market can have morally repugnant results; 
(2) government needs to intervene, aggressively if need be, to counteract 
those tendencies if the market is to be sustainable; (3) some amount of 
space, necessarily left undefined, should be left to the natural sphere of the 
market. Shelley brings it home: the court was deeply troubled by the social 
consequences of an unchecked property/contract matrix with respect to 
racial inequalities; the court argued for a more ―realistic‖ view of the state, 
which definitively exercised its power not only through the executive and 
the legislature, but through its courts as well; the court still managed to 
carve out an area where the state was believed absent. 
On the academic side, the corpus of work from Harold Lasswell, Myres 
McDougal, and later W. Michael Reisman, or what was more colloquially 
known as ―McDougal & Associates,‖ is similarly illustrative. Like many 
others of their generation,
32
 Lasswell and McDougal were post-realists in 
the sense that they were deeply informed by early 20th century attacks on 
both the liberalism and formalism of classic legal thought. That is, they 
were convinced of not only the morally unacceptable nature of laissez-
faire, but also the intellectual bankruptcy of formalistic thinking about law 
and policy. Legal realists, and those like Lasswell and McDougal who 
were working in the early wake of the realist onslaught, were all beholden 
to the emergence of American Pragmatism.
33
 The hand of John Dewey, for 
instance, is explicit in the work of famous realists like Felix Cohen and 
 
 
 30. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. 
 31. Id. at 13–14. 
 32. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1979). 
 33. See generally SCHLEGEL, supra note 24. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
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Walter Wheeler Cook,
34
 as well as in the tremendously influential work of 
Lasswell and McDougal.
35
  
Lasswell and McDougal‘s ―Policy Perspective‖ steadily developed 
over the course of the 20th century as what is probably best understood as 
an international variant of the legal process school. At bottom, the idea 
was to take many of Dewey‘s insights and elevate them beyond critique 
and into institutional form. This new institutionalism would be guided by 
the freshest of cutting edge thinking about real social problems, the 
functional nature of law, an understanding of the deeply political nature of 
law, and a process-oriented program in which a legal regime would be put 
under constant pressure for reappraisal due to persistent exposure to local 
instances of problem-solving. In Dewey‘s fashion, the basic goals of the 
regime would be very broad—in their case, it was ―human dignity‖—and 
the actual meaning of the goal would only be discovered through practice, 
and not before it. The goal values could be achieved only through 
―continuous reappraisal of the circumstances in which specific 
institutional combinations can make the greatest net contribution to the 
over-arching goal.‖36 To the extent that the goal might find itself 
manifested differently in the specifics of various local contexts, these 
―varying detailed practices by which the overriding goals are sought need 
not necessarily be fatal . . . but can be made creative in promoting [our 
goals].‖37 
Of course, given that Lasswell and McDougal‘s approach became a 
school of thought in its own right, it would be misleading to suggest that 
these were the indelible hallmarks of the New Haven School, but at least 
in 1959, this much was clear. In that year, Lasswell and McDougal 
published one of the seminal tracts of their new post-realist policy 
approach in ―The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order.‖38 As mentioned, the fundamental point of departure was 
premised on avoiding old debates about the distinction between law and 
politics, or state and market. In order to bypass administrative hangups 
like these, the new policy perspective required open-mindedness from its 
 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Lasswell, a scholar of political science, psychology, communications, and law, worked 
directly in Dewey‘s shadow while at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. For discussions of the 
approach of the New Haven School, see McDougal‟s Jurisprudence, 79 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 
266 (1985); Symposium, The New New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT‘L L. 299 (2007). 
 36. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse 
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT‘L L. 1, 5 (1959) (emphasis omitted). 
 37. Id. at 6. 
 38. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 36.  
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agents whereby ―the institutional details of all systems of public order are 
open to reconsideration in the light of the contribution they will make to 
the realization of human dignity in theory and fact.‖39 The basic 
architecture involved a series of tasks for the administrator: (1) orient 
oneself to the largest possible context of evolving social processes;
40
 
(2) develop an understanding of how local communities generate 
expectations about the process of authoritative decision-making, whether 
these decisions are located in the public or private sphere;
41
 (3) take a view 
of regulation as a mixture of prescriptive norms, softer recommendations, 
the application of both hard and soft norms, and an ongoing appraisal of 
the work of the norms at the street-level;
42
 and (4) keep in mind the 
broader framework goal of furthering human dignity, and in keeping with 
post-realist preference for process over rule, think of this goal as 
deliberately open-ended and as ―a social process in which values are 
widely and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than 
coercion, is emphasized as the predominant modality of power.‖43  
Roughly around the time that the US Supreme Court began its 
courtship of the modern liberal style and scholars like Lasswell and 
McDougal started building their post-realist machinery, lawyers and 
economists began an effort to theorize the export of the industrial model of 
economic development to the Third World. There is little doubt that 
attempts in the West to ―civilize,‖ ―modernize,‖ and ―develop‖ the non-
West began well before World War II.
44
 Nevertheless, the notion that it 
 
 
 39. Id. at 6. 
 40. Id. at 7–8. 
 41. Id. at 8. 
 42. Id. at 9–10. 
 43. Id. at 11. 
 44. As John Ohnesorge has similarly pointed out, ―Today‘s histories of law and development 
typically begin during the modernization era of the 1950s and 1960s, though this fails to address the 
central role of law and legal imposition in the era of colonization. However, it is fair to date the current 
mode of law and development activities to the 1960s, when primarily Western governments, 
institutions, and academics became involved with the legal systems of many developing and newly-
independent countries.‖ John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and 
Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 219, 222–
23 (2007). There is any number of points in the historical record that might be chosen as a starting 
point for the West‘s ―civilizing‖ mission. An example would be the work of Francisco Vitoria, who in 
the early Sixteenth Century advised King Charles of the Habsburg Empire on the legalities and 
arguments in favor of the conquest of the New World. Among these arguments was the idea that 
through exposure to Spanish culture and Christian religion, the Indians would engage in trade and 
generate economic development in the European tradition. Francisco Vitoria, On the American 
Indians, in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 278–84 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 2008). 
For discussions of Vitoria, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 1 
(1986). More generally, see MARTII KOSKENIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2002).  
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was at this time that the Western industrialized nations first took hold of 
the idea—in the wake of a frightening, postwar economic climate—is 
commonplace in the literature on development studies.
45
 To be sure, there 
is much sense to the argument that, surveying a broken Europe, the United 
States perceived a brave new market waiting to be opened in the colonized 
world. But two obstacles stood in the way. First, the former colonies 
would need to establish their political independence so they could transact 
in the global economy as sovereign states.
46
 Next, they would need to 
develop their economies in line with modern industrialized societies.
47
 
These two problems called for a division of labor, where diplomats and 
lawyers would handle the former, and economists would tackle the latter. 
Thus was born the field of development economics. 
The names Ragnar Nurkse, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Albert Hirschman, 
Arthur Lewis, and Walt Whitman Rostow, are typically associated with 
this first wave of work in the 1950s, all of whom were generally 
influenced by Keynes.
48
 As a result, their prescriptions for economic 
development all tended to gravitate around a core set of ideas. Among 
them were a focus on savings and investment, methods for augmenting 
demand over worries about supply shortages, and above all an image of an 
aggressive, large-scale, interventionist government. Markets were 
important, to be sure, but only insofar as they produced results in keeping 
with theories of distributive justice, and not because of any particular 
ideals the rules of the market might have otherwise symbolized.  
As a result of this confined idea about market performance, tasks that 
the market might fail should be picked up by state agencies. Consequently, 
some of the big ideas that came out of this period were the theory of the 
big push (the idea that a synchronized plan of several major industrial 
investments would lead to a chain reaction of ―virtuous circles‖ 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
98 (2009). 
 46. For discussion of the decolonization process under international law, see ANGHIE, supra note 
44; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
 47. For histories, see ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST 
FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); H. W. ARNDT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE 
HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1987); GERALD M. MEIER, BIOGRAPHY OF A SUBJECT: AN EVOLUTION OF 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (2005); GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN 
ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH (2002). For critical analysis, see ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING 
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD (1995); RETHINKING 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003). 
 48. THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936) was Keynes‘ most 
influential text. For some recent examinations of Keynes, see MICHAEL S. LAWLOR, THE ECONOMICS 
OF KEYNES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT (2006); DONALD MARKWELL, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006). 
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multiplying their effects through the economy);
49
 the theory of unbalanced 
growth (the idea that massive investment in only key industrial sectors, 
due to scarcity of resources, would create supply bottlenecks elsewhere in 
the economy, with the effect of creating pressure for new investment 
―linkages‖ between industry partners);50 the theory of surplus labor (the 
idea that the problem of having too few workers employed in higher-
income positions could be remedied through transferring workers from 
agriculture to industry without doing harm to the agricultural sector due to 
the establishment of more efficient means of labor);
51
 the theory of stages 
of growth (the idea that all developed societies move through a series of 
progressive stages, including the destruction of traditional society and the 
setting of industrialization‘s ―preconditions,‖ and the ―take-off‖ into 
sustained development).
52
 
Though also writing in this same period, writers like Raul Prebisch,
53
 
Andre Gunder Frank, and Gunnar Myrdal belong to a separate group of 
development economists due to their shared theses about how the structure 
of trade relations was deeply flawed in a way that favored the West at the 
expense of the rest.
54
 For Prebish and his early version of dependency 
theory, the idea was that as long as industrialized nations export 
manufactured goods, and the Third World exports raw materials for use in 
those goods, the benefits of trade would always accumulate at the center, 
and at the risk of harming the periphery.
55
 Following this diagnosis, some 
 
 
 49. RAGNAR NURKSE, PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(1953); Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, The Theory of the Big Push, in LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 3d (Gerald Meier ed., 1976). 
 50. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958). 
 51. W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 MANCH. 
SCH. ECON. SOC. 139 (1954) 
 52. W. W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
(1960). 
 53. See generally Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 251 
(1959); The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems, U.N. Dep‘t of 
Econ., U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/89/rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 1950.II.G.2 (1950). 
 54. Two other well-known economists that are also said to belong to the ―heterodox‖ school 
include Clarence Ayres and Gunnar Myrdal. CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at 180. Both writers 
were associated with institutional economics, which Cypher and Dietz define as an academic focus on 
the ―institutions of an economy, that is, the forms of productions, ownership, work processes, and 
ideologies which combine to create an economy and society. . . . Since, furthermore, such institutions 
are subject to evolutionary change, the process of studying economics should also properly be 
evolutionary.‖ Id. For representative publications, see C.E. Ayres, Economic Development: An 
Institutionalist Perspective, in LATIN AMERICA‘S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89 (James L. Dietz ed., 
1991); GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY (1970).  
 55. This idea also became associated with the work of Hans Singer, and what was later labeled 
the ―Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis.‖ See H.W. Singer, Terms of Trade and Economic Development, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); JOHN TOYE & 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 15 
 
 
 
 
development economists tailored their proposals to a refashioning of the 
internal markets of developing countries in order to shift away from raw 
exports and towards manufactured goods.
56
 The basic idea was that 
governments first needed to set up strict tariff barriers, barring access to 
foreign firms wishing to sell manufactured goods in the local market. If 
the developing state failed to do this, and left its borders open to ―free 
trade,‖ local producers would never stand a chance in bringing cheap and 
simple durable goods to market. If foreign competition was eliminated, 
local producers could slowly build their infant industries, and while 
consumers would suffer insofar as they faced less choices in the market, 
this was viewed as the kind of strong medicine required to move forward. 
Thus, this strategy substituted local manufactured goods for imports as a 
vehicle for the industrialization process. 
All in all, the 1960s and ‗70s had its share of optimists and critics, 
arguing in turn for in many cases large, and in other cases very large 
amounts of state ―control‖ over developing markets.57 In terms of a 
general consensus among economists at the ―center,‖ the 1960s was 
probably a decade in which there was more hope than pessimism, touched 
off with the exciting prospect that much of the developing world was 
about to take flight via the logic of Rostow‘s theory of growth (published 
in 1960), and the anointing by the United Nations of the coming years as a 
 
 
RICHARD TOYE, THE UN AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2004). ―In this perspective, the 
more advanced center countries tend to reap the gains from international trade and investment at the 
expense of the less-developed periphery. Indeed, trade relations between the center and periphery 
reinforce higher levels of development in the center countries, while maintaining a relatively lower 
level of development and poverty in the periphery. In Prebisch and Singer‘s analysis, then, free trade 
can actually be harmful to the peripheral, less-developed nations.‖ CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at 
175. 
 56. ―The principal characteristic of structuralism is that it takes as its object of investigation a 
‗system,‘ that is, the reciprocal relations among parts of a whole, rather than the study of the different 
parts in isolation. In a more specific sense this concept is used by those theories that hold that there are 
a set of social and economic structures that are unobservable but which generate observable social and 
economic phenomena.‖ J.G. Palma, Structuralism, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55, at 316. Gerald Meier has described dependency theory as contending 
that ―development problems of the periphery are to be understood in terms of their insertion into the 
international capitalist system, rather than the terms of domestic considerations.‖ MEIER, supra note 
47, at 66. The problems of dependence by the developing countries on the developed world ―may refer 
not only to deterioration in the peripheral country‘s terms of trade but also to unequal bargaining 
power in foreign investment, transfer of technology, taxation, and relations with multinational 
corporations.‖ Id. For representative writing, see PAUL A. BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
GROWTH, supra note 24; CELSO FURTADO, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF BRAZIL (1963). The name for 
this shift is import substitution industrialization. For discussion, see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, 
at 271–98. 
 57. David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 95, 98–110. 
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―Decade of Development.‖58 Alas, the 1970s witnessed substantial 
disillusionment with these theories, as evidence mounted in opposition to 
the idea that economic development in the Third World was really 
happening, or at least, happening in any sort of predictable or consistent 
way.
59
  
Perhaps even more importantly, 1973 marked the beginning of 
transition in the global economy.
60
 It was in that year that the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (―OPEC‖) announced its price hike on 
oil exports, sending the world market into a tizzy. The Third World took 
an especially hard hit, forced to look for loans to replenish their quickly 
diminishing foreign exchange reserves. The process by which these 
nations ultimately found a new source of cash, though well-known and 
well-told, remains bizarre.
61
 OPEC states witnessed a hurricane of 
incoming profits as a result of the price increase, so much so that many 
states simply didn‘t have enough available opportunities to invest the 
funds. Needing somewhere to grow the money, they turned to the large 
investment banks in New York, London, and elsewhere. These banks, in 
turn, then faced the difficulty of finding enough borrowers to generate the 
interest they would have to pay the OPEC states. Where could the banks 
turn? Oddly, those very countries being squeezed by the price hike, and 
looking for loans to cover their increasing deficits, were the perfect market 
for the banks. Thus, the banks created the idea of the ―sovereign 
borrower,‖ and the phenomenon known as petrodollar recycling—the 
movement of Third World payments to OPEC states, funneled to the 
 
 
 58. President John F Kennedy inaugurated the ―Development Decade‖ in an address before the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1961. ―[We] must not divert our eyes or our energies from the 
harsh realities that face our fellow men. Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of 
meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no 
hope. That is why my nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help 
themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960s as the United Nations Decade 
of Development.‖ President John F. Kennedy, Address Before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (Sept. 25, 1961), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Refernce/JFK-
Speeches/Address-Before-the-General-Assembly-of-the-United-Nations-September-25-1961.aspx. For 
discussion, see RICHARD JOLLY, LOUIS EMMERIJ, DHARAM GHAI & FREDERIC LAPEYRE, UN 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND PRACTICE 85 (2004). 
 59. Gerald Meier writes: ―Concern about government failure became a landmark turning point in 
the thinking about development in the 1970s and 1980s. Contrary to the early development 
economists‘ advocacy of centralized government interventions to remedy market failures, an orthodox 
reaction now focused on government failure and its antidote of neoclassical economics.‖ MEIER, supra 
note 47, at 81. 
 60. See generally SCOTT NEWTON, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1944–2000: THE LIMITS OF 
IDEOLOGY (2004). 
 61. For discussion, see CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 45, at 529–48. 
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private investment banks, and loaned back to the Third World in order to 
make payments to OPEC.  
In contrast to these developments in development economics, what of 
the modern style of liberal legalism?  Was it true that lawyers were only 
concerned with making colonies into sovereigns? While it cannot be 
denied that international lawyers were certainly preoccupied with 
―decolonization,‖ by and large it was domestic lawyers, coming from the 
social sciences, who worked to assist the developing world in the 
establishment of transplanted legal systems. Looking back from 1974, 
Marc Galanter and David Trubek saw the ―law and development‖ 
movement as having six propositions animating this project.
62
 First, the 
state must be recognized as the focal point of social control, though the 
state should never be viewed as a moral end in itself.
63
 Its purpose is to 
facilitate the efforts of individuals to pursue their preferences, though 
these preferences are subject to the state‘s coercive restrictions. Second, 
the state‘s facilitative and coercive functions are always subject to the 
legal order which consists of general, universal, and neutral constraints on 
public authority.
64
 Third, the rules in the legal order are ―consciously 
designed to achieve social purposes‖ by a democratically organized 
electorate in which all members are free and equal in their opportunities to 
make their voices heard.
65
 Fourth, these rules are applied equally, and 
consistently with their purposes.
66
 Fifth, the judiciary is the central 
institution in the legal order, since it has the last word on a particular rule‘s 
social meaning.
67
 Sixth, these rules have a quasi-organic quality inasmuch 
as citizens have largely internalized the rules, and officials take the rules 
as guides before listening to their private and personal bases for decision-
making.
68
 Taken together, ―a legal system is an integrated purposive entity 
which draws on the power of the state but disciplines that power by its 
own autonomous and internally derived norms.‖69  
In this period before the rise of neoliberalism and the Rule of Law 
program, the primary focus of lawyers trying to use law as a means of 
economic development was to take this set of modern liberal ideas, and 
 
 
 62. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974). 
 63. Id. at 1071. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1072. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
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teach it to the judges, lawyers, and law students of the Third World.
70
 The 
hope was that, just as this image of an empowered class of legal 
professionals in the Western world generated the modern market society, 
so would it to do the same elsewhere.
71
 As for what precisely it would do, 
the idea was that a transplanted liberal legal order would promote freedom, 
equality, community, and ultimately enhance social welfare through a 
series of spillover effects. Liberalization in one sector of developing 
society, be it through import substitution or the creation of an Anglo-
American judiciary, would hopefully bring about a ripple of modernizing 
effects. Deng Xiao Ping‘s effort to liberalize China‘s economy in 1978, for 
example, was widely believed to be a precursor to liberal democracy and 
civil rights.
72
  
Despite the fundamental focus on legal education, this period was 
nevertheless accompanied by an armada of changes to the legal fabric of 
the importing society: ―‗Import substitution‘ industrialization demanded 
the creation of numerous public law institutions, established by statute and 
implemented by public law bureaucracies: exchange controls, credit 
licensing schemes, tariffs, subsidy programs, tax incentives, price controls, 
national commodity monopolies.‖73 These transformations were new to 
most developing states, ―replacing colonial law, overturning customary 
law, and offering a largely public law framework for economic 
exchange.‖74 An explicit focus by ―law and development‖ practitioners on 
the strengthening of local legal elites, and the need for a background 
recognition that a transplanted image of the modern welfare state brought 
with it a dense web of legal requirements, was also accompanied by a 
perceived need for international laws that could track the ground rules and 
govern the development process from ―above.‖ Most notably, the 
motivation in giving law and development an international orientation 
drew from the ideas spinning out of dependency theory: if there was 
something broken in terms of international trade, international law seemed 
the natural hope for legislating a ―revision of the global economic and 
political order.‖75  
 
 
 70. David Trubek, supra note 7, at 76–77. 
 71. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 62, at 1075. For a contemporary critique of the economic 
mind-set, see RENTS, RENT-SEEKING, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
ASIA (Mushtag Khan & KS Jomo eds., 2000). 
 72. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2006). 
 73. David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57, at 102. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 115. Although much of the inspiration for this movement came from scholars living in 
the Third World, international lawyers based at the Columbia and N.Y.U. Law Schools were pivotal. 
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The shift to international law was largely taken by international 
lawyers from the Third World, and the most prominent manifestation in 
this context was the call for a ―New International Economic Order.‖76 
Articulated as a Declaration at a session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, the ideas behind the NIEO were big ones: the new international 
legal order would be ―based on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states 
irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct 
inequalities and redress existing injustices, and make it possible to 
eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing 
countries.‖77 The movement crystallized in Mohammad Bedjaoui‘s 
Towards a New International Economic Order, published in 1979, but was 
already being excavated only a few years later for the lessons of its 
failure.
78
  
III. THE THIRD GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL PRAGMATISM 
Thus far, we have reviewed the first two phases in Duncan Kennedy‘s 
story of American Legal Thought. I provided a snippet of Lockean 
property theory as a way of glimpsing the basic style of classical legal 
thought, and touched on the Supreme Court‘s Shelley decision and the 
early vision of the New Haven School as reflections of ―the social.‖ In 
addition, I relayed a very cursory telling of the conventional beginnings of 
the field known as ―law and development,‖ and situated that field in the 
context of modern liberalism and social legal thought. In the discussion 
that follows, I first present Kennedy‘s third phase of legal consciousness, 
and then reframe it in the language of pragmatism and liberalism. I then 
suggest that the pragmatic ―problem-solving‖ approach of contemporary 
legal thought is nicely illustrated in the current posture of the law and 
development field. After a review of the neoliberal pairing of the Rule of 
Law ideal with the World Bank‘s subsequent interest in the ―conflicting 
considerations‖ approach, the discussion then turns to ―experimental 
 
 
See, e.g., WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); Oscar 
Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. (1976); 
Thomas Franck, The New Development, Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help Developing 
Countries?, 12 WIS. L. REV. 767 (1972). 
 76. For a recent discussion, see BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003). 
 77. Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-
VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).  
 78. David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57, at 117–
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pragmatism.‖ Many scholars are now seeking shelter in the term, offering 
it as a route out of the contemporary gridlock. From the perspective of 
liberal legalism, the discussion asks whether an experimentalist 
perspective on problem-solving, at least in the hands of influential scholars 
like Charles Sabel, William Simon, and Cass Sunstein, provides us with 
such a route. My conclusion is hedged, but ultimately suggests that 
experimentalism will have a really hard time being ―experimental‖ so long 
as its methods are so deeply rooted in the liberal styles of the 20th century.  
A. Neoformalism and the Conflicting Considerations Approach 
In his description of contemporary legal thought, Duncan Kennedy has 
suggested that the present mode of legal analysis consists in the 
transformed elements of both CLT and social legal consciousness.
79
 That 
is, where we might be tempted to see a social antithesis to a classical 
thesis, there is no synthesis to be found in contemporary legal thought. 
There is no new, dominant set of ideas that can be contrasted with the 
ideas of previous periods. Instead, we have the debris left over after the 
attack on CLT, as well as the debris left over from the various critiques 
deployed against the social, including those movements that emerged in 
the 1970s like neoliberal styles of legal discourse in the form of the law 
and economics approach, neoformalist critiques from within the discourse 
of modern liberalism, like liberal constitutionalism and republicanism, and 
styles of critique attempting to stand outside of liberal legalism altogether, 
like critical legal studies. 
Consequently, Kennedy suggests that while contemporary legal 
thought lacks a large integrating concept, we can nevertheless identify two 
basic and ultimately contradictory kinds of langue: neoformalism, 
transformed from its origins in CLT, and the balancing of conflicting 
considerations, transformed from its functionalist origins in social legal 
consciousness. There is no end to the sorts of examples we might choose 
to illustrate the combination of these modes of reasoning, and so to take 
one at random, consider the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 2008 decision in 
Medellin v. Texas.
80
 The case was a controversial one, dealing with the 
double approach of the United States judiciary to the International Court 
of Justice‘s Avena decision,81 and a subsequent executive order from U.S. 
 
 
 79. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3, at 63–73. 
 80. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 81. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).  
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President George W. Bush seeking to implement that decision.
82
 The 
dispute made its way to the ICJ via a complaint from Mexico against the 
United States, in which the former claimed that the latter had violated 
certain rights due to Mexican nationals under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations. The ICJ ruled that U.S. officials had failed to fulfill 
those obligations, and President Bush ordered the state courts of Texas to 
review the conviction of the identified Mexican nationals in light of 
Avena.
83
 
The question before the Supreme Court was what to make of all this. 
After sweeping aside the idea that the US Supreme Court was obliged to 
follow orders either from the ICJ or the US President, the Court sought to 
independently answer the question of whether the US had certain 
obligations under the Vienna Convention, and in the parlance of the 
controversy, whether that treaty was self-executing. The Court was split. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts made a series of sharply 
defined neoformalist moves.  
First, Roberts acknowledged the validity and efficacy of international 
law. ―No one disputes that the Avena decision . . . constitutes an 
international law obligation on the part of the United States.‖84 Roberts 
made it clear that the relevant question here was not whether international 
legal obligations exist, per se, but whether in this case it was possible to 
deduce a directly effective legal obligation from any relevant treaties 
regarding these Mexican nationals residing in Texas. This question, it 
turned out, was easy. The majority‘s approach was this: Once the relevant 
texts are examined, a court is obliged to follow a legal formula instructing 
it to search out any language providing a private party with a right to 
enforce the treaty. Upon finding such language, a court should determine 
that the treaty is directly effective in court. Without the language, it‘s not. 
Roberts didn‘t find anything on point, and in the absence of the operative 
words, the majority concluded with a third point: ―where a treaty does not 
provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the 
courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.‖85 
This conception regarding an important distinction between law-making 
and law-applying, where the business of law-makers is necessarily 
ideological and the business of law-appliers is objective, was further 
elaborated in Justice Robert‘s critique of Justice Breyer‘s dissent.  
 
 
 82. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502. 
 83. Id. at 503. 
 84. Id. at 504. 
 85. Id. at 513–14 (quoting Sanchez-Lamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)). 
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In making an argument that has all the hallmarks of the conflicting 
considerations approach, Breyer suggested that the presence or absence of 
certain language is totally beside the point.
86
 In contrast to Roberts‘ focus 
on formal rules, Breyer‘s claim was that the ―case law suggests practical, 
context-specific criteria‖ that should be used to help a court decide 
whether a treaty was self-executing. Breyer‘s approach demanded answers 
to a series of fact-based questions, such as the purpose of the treaty, its 
historical and political context, and whether the treaty seemed more or less 
focused on judicial application or not. Breyer recognized that these sorts 
of questions did not yield ―a simple test, let alone a magical formula.‖87 
But given the actual and realistic unavailability of a meaningful textual 
approach like Roberts‘, the focus on the function of the treaty and the 
effort to balance all the extraneous factors is all a court can really ever 
hope to do.  
The majority was unhappy with this response. Justice Roberts argued 
that Breyer‘s notions were notoriously ad hoc, indeterminate, incapable of 
actually providing predictable guidance, and probably most important of 
all, ―tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to 
interpret but also to create the law.‖88  
Medellin provides a good example of how the language of classic 
liberalism and modern liberalism oscillates in the standard moves of our 
contemporary jurisprudence. That is, as Kennedy rightly argues, the 
modes of reasoning that defined classical legal thought and social legal 
thought have not been borrowed wholesale from prior moments in the 
history of our jurisprudence. We have not looked into the closets of our 
parents, and thrilled at the sight of clothes thought hideous by a former 
generation. Contemporary legal thought is a new breed: neoformalism is 
not the will theory, and the conflicting considerations approach is not 
welfarist functionalism. 
These insights into the present situation do not, however, require us to 
see contemporary legal consciousness as only a pile of scattered debris. 
One possibility is that there actually is a new integrating concept, a new 
langue that can explain and embody the strange union of the transformed 
elements of the classic and modern forms of liberal legalism. That 
integrating concept could be something called ―pragmatism.‖89 An 
 
 
 86. Id. at 549. 
 87. Id. at 550. 
 88. Id. at 516. 
 89. Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics, supra note 2; see also Justin Desautels-Stein, 
Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the Pragmatist Style, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 499 (2008). 
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immediate question is whether pragmatism is new, and our intuition may 
very well be to say that its not. Let us then disaggregate the term a bit in 
order to see if there is something about pragmatism that is indigenous to 
contemporary legal consciousness. 
A first category is ―philosophical pragmatism.‖90 This is a pragmatism 
that holds itself out as a way of thinking about epistemology, ethics, is-
oughts, universals, consequentialism, and other standards in the canons of 
moral and political philosophy.
91
 The founding triumvirate, as is well 
known, includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. 
There may be less consensus when we start to think about the availability 
of a body of work called ―neo-pragmatist,‖ but the nature of the 
conversation is pretty familiar. It‘s a conversation about the likes of 
Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Stanley Fish, Jurgen Habermas, Richard 
Bernstein, and others that have attempted to interpret the older generation 
of pragmatists in light of a more particular theory of what philosophical 
pragmatism entails.
92
 With respect to either brand of philosophical 
pragmatism, it is clear that neither is couched as a theory of law. To be 
sure, many of these scholars have applied the prior work to legal 
questions, but it‘s always a matter of philosophy applied to law, not 
pragmatism as a theory of law first.
93
 
In contrast to philosophical pragmatism is a second category, 
popularized by Richard Posner.
94
 This is an ―everyday pragmatism‖ in the 
vernacular. It is the pragmatism that is constantly deployed in the 
newspapers, by pundits and politicians.
95
 It is almost universally 
understood in the context of the United States as a badge of honor to be 
known as a pragmatist. These pragmatists are against ideology, against 
 
 
 90. For discussion, see JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (1957); WILLIAM 
JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY (1979); HILARY 
PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002); HILARY 
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND 
SOLIDARITY (1989); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY, 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). For representatively general treatments, see 
CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B. Rosenthal et al. eds., 
1999); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001); JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM 
PIERCE TO DAVIDSON (1990); THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY 
ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL THOUGHT (William Eggington & Mike 
Sandbothe eds., 2004); PRAGMATISM, CRITIQUE, JUDGMENT: ESSAYS FOR RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN 
(Seyla Benhabib & Nancy Fraser eds., 2004); THE RANGE OF PRAGMATISM AND THE THE LIMITS OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Richard Shusterman ed., 2004). 
 91. Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics, supra note 2, at 576–86. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 595. 
 95. Id. 
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foundational theory, against theories of truth or right. They will do what 
they need to do in order to get it done. Whatever works. Action-oriented 
thinking. ―Just Do It.‖96 President Obama has consistently portrayed 
himself as a pragmatist, and against ideology, in precisely the same way 
that his opponents on the right do the same thing.
97
  
Of course, there are many complaints about everyday pragmatism. One 
is that it appears to have nothing at all do with its philosophical cousin. 
Among many other things, philosophical pragmatism is explosive. For the 
believer, it renders so many propositions about the known world into fuzz. 
Everything opens up for the serious pragmatist, where the well-known 
saying about William James becomes a saying about everything: ―He was 
so extremely natural that there was no knowing what his nature was, or 
what to expect next.‖98 In this way of thinking, nature becomes a site of 
constant knowing and unknowing, where little if anything can be said 
about the way things ought to be done. It is an undeniably subversive 
approach to world order. In contrast, the everyday pragmatist is a soldier 
in favor the status quo. She doesn‘t believe in a so-called ideology, 
wanting only to tinker at the margins, slowly and incrementally. It‘s a 
view of the world that basically takes it as it is, hoping to slowly make it 
better, but knowing that it‘s already pretty good to begin with. 
A third category of pragmatism is legal pragmatism, and it is legal 
pragmatism that may offer us a language that can capture the modes of 
reasoning we see in our contemporary jurisprudence. In terms of mapping 
legal pragmatism itself, there appear to be several varieties.
99
 One is 
―eclectic pragmatism.‖ Eclectic pragmatism is easy to understand, since it 
is essentially the layering of everyday pragmatism onto the problematics 
of legal discourse. Just as everyday pragmatism is alienated from 
philosophical pragmatism, so is eclectic pragmatism. It is this divorce that 
has led writers like Posner, Rorty, and Tom Grey to all make the claim for 
 
 
 96. Apparently, Nike‘s famous slogan came about after an ad man praised Nike for its brazenly 
―can-do‖ attitude, and said, ―You Nike guys, you just do it.‖ Nike‘s Just Do It Advertising Campaign, 
Center for Applied Research, available at http://www.cfar.com/Documents/nikecmp.pdf. 
 97. In transforming himself in preparation for his candidacy for President, Newt Gingrich 
attempted to situate himself more pragmatically. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Gingrich in 
Power, Pragmatism, not Purity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011. 
 98. MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB, supra note 90, at 77 (quoting George Santayana). 
 99. In this Article, I am concerned with ―eclectic pragmatism‖ and ―experimental pragmatism.‖ 
Another, increasingly popular style of legal pragmatism is ―economic pragmatism,‖ which is distinct 
from both neoclassical and behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics, supra note 2, at 
595–605, 611–22. 
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a legal pragmatism ―freestanding‖ from the work of James, Dewey, and 
company.  
Before moving on to the other forms of legal pragmatism, the 
connection between eclectic pragmatism and contemporary legal 
consciousness deserves another word. After all, we might intuitively see a 
connection between the ―conflicting considerations‖ approach and eclectic 
pragmatism, but what of neoformalism? How does eclectic pragmatism 
ally with a style of jurisprudence which seems at first blush to be in 
tension with the basic commitments of the everyday pragmatist?  
In order to properly understand these questions, we need to distinguish 
between the self-identified legal pragmatist as an individual agent, either 
in the guise of a judge or administrator or whoever, and legal pragmatism 
as a form of legal consciousness. In the first case, we can look to the 
works of scholars like Cass Sunstein as representative of an idea about a 
status-quo jurisprudence, based on an attraction to context and an 
abhorrence towards grand theory and foundations.
100
 The work of law 
should be a law that works, solving problems through an appreciation of 
economics, sociology, political science, and whatever other forms of 
knowledge-production may help us steadily move forward in the 
elaboration of a ―better‖ law. In this sense, the eclectic pragmatist does not 
seem readily susceptible to the dynamics of neoformalism and its 
attachment to rights and right thinking. 
When we recognize that eclectic pragmatism is also a sensibility, and 
not merely a professional identity, this tension quickly fades. The average 
judge, the average associate at a law firm, the average policy wonk, the 
average ―American,‖ doesn‘t hold the same sorts of quasi-consequentialist 
 
 
 100. Here I am referring to Sustein‘s theory of ―minimalism.‖ Sunstein describes minimalism in 
the following way: ―Minimalists are skeptical of rights fundamentalism, certainly when the Court is 
initially confronting difficult questions. They fear that expansive conceptions of rights may be 
confounded by unanticipated situations. Nor do minimalists have much enthusiasm for the idea of 
democratic primacy; they fear that a wholesale rejection of rights claims will prove embarrassing or 
worse in the future. Minimalists prefer small steps over large ones. . . . To support that preference, 
minimalists invoke several considerations. The initial point is pragmatic: as Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
comments suggest, no consensus may be possible on a more ambitious ruling. . . . There is an 
independent point, closely connected with the argument for trimming. Insofar as they are shallow, 
minimalist rulings show a kind of respect to those with competing commitments on issues of principle 
and policy. If a ruling can command agreement from people with fundamentally different views, it 
demonstrates respect to those people, and even shows them a degree of charity. To the extent that 
judges have a degree of diversity, the respect that they show one another extends to their fellow 
citizens as well. When judges embrace shallowness, minimalists seek to obtain some of the virtues of 
the ‗overlapping consensus‘ defended in accounts of political liberalism.‖ Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1081–83 (2009). 
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commitments of a Sunstein or Farber.
101
 They are rather far more inclined 
to use whatever mode of reasoning will be the most successful in 
achieving their given ends. This is the mindset in which it becomes normal 
to hear big-firm associates, and even partners, talk of using critical legal 
studies, when it works. It doesn‘t matter what critical legal studies, or 
behavioral law and economics, or public choice theory, or human rights 
law, might actually mean in terms of its political stakes. The only thing 
that matters for the eclectic pragmatist is that they select the mode of 
reasoning, whether it falls within the langue of formalism or the langue of 
functionalism, that wins. If it gets the client what he wants, use it. If it gets 
a politician elected, do it. If it solves our problems, try it.  
The notion that this form of legal pragmatism might constitute a 
contemporary legal consciousness comes into view when we bring liberal 
legalism back into the story. If classical legal consciousness was related to 
classic liberalism, and social legal consciousness was related to modern 
liberalism, where is liberalism in the legal consciousness that we have 
today?  
Eclectic pragmatism instructs us on the merits of having lost faith in 
either the classic or modern styles of liberal legalism. We no longer 
believe in the dominance of the will theory as the way in which to 
understand the role of law in the constitution of society, and we also no 
longer believe in the dominance of state interventionism as the universal 
corrective. And in the light of eclectic pragmatism, this is a moral good. In 
this view, faith in any particular liberal approach gets in the way of getting 
what we want, and getting what we want is what matters. The eclectic 
pragmatist has most assuredly lost faith in both classic liberalism and 
modern liberalism, which accounts for why contemporary legal thought 
consists in the transformed elements of CLT and the social, and not just a 
blending of those elements. But here‘s the key: the eclectic pragmatist has 
not lost faith in liberalism. Indeed, what appears to have shaped up is a 
sort of ―pragmatist liberal legalism‖ in which the jurist is completely 
committed to the vocabulary of classic and modern liberals, but at the 
same time denies the faith that classic and modern liberals had in the 
rightness of their respective modes of legal reasoning. The eclectic 
pragmatist also has faith, but it is a faith rooted in the rightness of 
liberalism, but not in any one of its predominant modes. 
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Legal pragmatism thus sustains the paradoxical alliance between 
neoformalism and policy balancing. It keeps the two going—without 
pragmatism, we might very well see a different form of legal 
consciousness. If we weren‘t committed to a crass vision of ―what works,‖ 
something else would be necessary to justify the continuation of a much 
maligned style of formalism. At the same time, it is eclectic pragmatism 
that inoculates policy balancing from fatal critique. It is pragmatism that 
makes it possible to say: ―We do these things because they work, not 
because they‘re right.‖  
B. Law & Development in the Third Globalization 
Just as the law and development movement in the middle years of the 
20th century reflected the consciousness of social legal thought, so does 
the contemporary style of law and development policy reflect the 
pragmatist consciousness of contemporary legal thought. As discussed 
below, the contemporary phase of the field tracks the bifurcated nature of 
the third globalization‘s legal pragmatism, housing both orientations that 
take neoformalism as a point of departure and orientations that take 
neoformalism as merely one variable in a constellation of conflicting 
considerations.  
1. Neoliberalism and the Rule of Law 
The emergence of neoformalism and neoliberalism in the last decades 
of the 20th century was attended by a war cry: ―The Rule of Law!‖ Of 
course, at its most fundamental, the idea is hardly one over which 
neoliberals hold a monopoly. Indeed, classic and modern liberalism share 
a great deal of common ground with regard to a general conception of the 
Rule of Law.
102
 This conception has several elements.  
 
 
 102. For discussions of the ―Rule of Law‖ in general see Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the 
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1 (2008); RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil 
Walker eds., 2009); Colloquium, The Rule of Law Papers, 43 INT‘L LAW. 1 (2009); RULES OF LAW 
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eds., 2009); BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW (Erik G. 
Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM (Pietro 
Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, 
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First is the principle of legal autonomy.
103
 That is, liberal law must be 
autonomous from the society that it is meant to govern, for if law is unable 
to maintain a degree of independence from its subjects, the distinction 
between law and politics collapses.
104
 At the same time, liberal law must 
also be autonomous from any particular religious or moral code, since the 
identification of law with morality would render useless the whole idea of 
society being governed by a set of rules to which it has consented.
105
 
Another way of putting this is that, in liberal society, it is essential that 
rulers be constrained by something other than their own personal 
worldviews; the law must be autonomous from personal morality, and 
autonomous from personal politics.
106
 Legal autonomy must also be 
institutionally viable—the Rule of Law cannot be applied and interpreted 
by a political body, namely the legislature, and so a separation of powers 
is necessary to inoculate the judiciary from the political nature of rule-
creation and to set in motion the judicial nature of rule-ascertainment.
107
 
Due to the necessity of keeping rule-ascertainment autonomous from rule-
creation, liberal law also requires the idea of legal reasoning to be 
autonomous from other forms of reasoning, such as happens in politics, 
economics, or religion.
108
  
A second aspect of liberal law is legislative generality.
109
 Liberal law 
should not cater to the preferences of any particular group, but must 
instead be couched in universal, neutral terms.
110
 In this way, generality is 
said to bring with it a sense of procedural fairness, as the motivating idea 
is to make general prescriptions for the population without favoring 
 
 
 103. Most scholars seem attracted to an idea of ―Relative autonomy‖. Among other things, classic 
and modern liberals share a belief in the constitutive power of law. That is, liberalism holds as a 
political prerequisite the possibility of a legal order which exists independently of the market, but is at 
the same time capable of shaping the foundational materials of market society. Traditionally, liberals 
have stressed the law‘s independence from economics and politics, and neglected the details of law‘s 
background role in economic theory. The reason legal independence or autonomy has been understood 
as a critical component of the liberal program, since this is the only way to guarantee that the 
sovereign will exercise its power in a neutral and general way, constrained by preexisting norms and 
prohibited from ruling on the basis of its own preferences or ideological outlook. For discussions of 
relative autonomy, see Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the „Relative 
Autonomy‟ of the Law, 11 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 571 (1977); Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative 
Autonomy” of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1994 (1998). 
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 105. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 102, at 83–103. 
 106. Waldron, supra note 102, at 6–7. 
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substantive conceptions of what it means to lead a good life.
111
 General 
legislation must also be clear, public, and predictable, so that the general 
population is easily able to understand and rely on a set of norms that will 
guide their expectations as they compete in market society.
112
  
A third and related aspect of liberal law is the uniform interpretation 
and application of the law through the courts.
113
 Just as a violation of 
legislative generality would undermine the liberal value of a free and equal 
citizenry, so too would the persistence of judicial preferences in the 
application of the law rob citizens of their right to have the law 
administered equally and without regard to political dispositions.
114
 
With respect to the rhetorical power of the Rule of Law ideal, consider 
the contrasting works of Friedrich Hayek and Roberto Unger. Both agree 
that liberal law requires a commitment to autonomy, generality, and 
uniformity. They also agree that liberal law is substantively characterized 
by a set of background rules, which are then offset by a set of 
bureaucratized regulations, or foreground rules. With regard to the 
evolution of these background rules over time, Hayek and Unger both 
emphasize their connection with customary law, the relationship of custom 
to the Rule of Law, and the liberal need for the constitution to safeguard 
the Rule of Law from state interference.
115
 As Unger has said, ―The 
animating idea is the effort to make patent the hidden legal content of a 
free political and economic order. This content consists in a system of 
property and contract rights and in a system of public-law arrangements 
and entitlements safeguarding the private order.‖116  
Hayek explained that the Rule of Law, which he also called ―rules of 
just conduct,‖ evolved because it was successful—it beat out other rules, 
 
 
 111. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998); ROBERT 
DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (2000). 
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 114. Of course, there is a deep and wide disagreement about how these elements are actually 
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or customs, because it made for better lives.
117
 It would be a mistake to 
believe, however, that the adherents of these customs ever consciously 
promulgated them, or may have even been able to articulate them. 
Customs were, instead, manifested in the regularity of practice: ―The 
important point is that every man growing up in a given culture will find 
in himself rules, or may discover that he acts in accordance with rules—
and will similarly recognize the actions of others as conforming or not 
conforming to various rules.‖118 What follows from this spontaneous and 
organic conception of rules is the idea that they cannot be attributed to any 
conscious, deliberate, human design.
119
 For Hayek these rules of conduct 
are therefore, by definition, pre-political, just as in the same way that the 
growth of organic compounds or the arrangements of magnetic fields are 
wholly natural.
120
 These customary rules form the core of the Rule of Law.  
While the Rule of Law is the essence of the liberal legal order, Hayek 
reminds that where foreground rules are necessarily distributive, the Rule 
of Law is ―independent of any common purpose,‖ blindly and equally 
applicable to all.
121
 Real freedom, as a result, is therefore conditioned on a 
choice of background rules (the Rule of Law) over foreground rules 
(legislation), where the Rule of Law is understood as permissive and 
enabling, and legislation is prohibitive and coercive.
122
 Hayek helpfully 
concludes that everything he has discussed with regard to the rules of 
conduct operating in the spontaneous order and the willy-nilly legislative 
caprice of governmental organization, tracks exactly the distinction 
between private and public law, respectively.
123
 Also, and again, Hayek 
says that with regard to constitutional law, its fame has been 
misconceived. Constitutional law‘s job is simply to ―secure the 
maintenance of the law‖124—meaning the common law of property and 
contract. Unger underlines the point as well when he explains that, as a 
first way of protecting the liberal principles of property and contract, 
courts rely on interpretive methods to shift rules that have tended towards 
distributive, non-neutral policies back towards the Rule of Law.
125
 When 
this is not enough, ―[t]he back-up policing practice is constitutional 
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invalidation, striking down those instances of redistribution through law 
that cannot be preempted through improving interpretation.‖126 
Hayek firmly believed that liberal law led to the most just kind of 
society men could feasibly attain, and this justice flowed from the primal 
waters of property and contract law. Finally abandoning the feudal road, 
Hayek argued that the ―decisive step‖ in humanity‘s progressive evolution 
was the discovery of the bargain.
127
 But the ability to consistently 
determine what belonged to who, and how to trade one thing for another, 
depended on the development of property and contract rules.
128
 If this 
never were to happen, ideas like ―ownership‖ and ―bargain‖ would never 
have had any real meaning.
129
 Hayek argued that these new rules of 
conduct were the mechanisms of coexistence, were definitively non-
coercive, and had as their central function the creation of a society in 
which people with different outlooks on life, with different values for 
different products, could live together in peace.
130
 What was required was 
a law that told no man what he ought to do, but could ―tell each what he 
can count upon, what material objects or services he can use for his 
purposes, and what is the range of actions open to him.‖131 Though Hayek 
imagined the private law as non-coercive and pre-political in a very strong 
sense, he nevertheless did, like Locke before him, believe that the market 
brought with it more than a sustainable peace (essential as that was), but a 
just society as well. It was not that either of them thought that the moral 
content of property and contract would generate any particular 
constellation of social outcomes, but rather that it was the process of the 
private law that was just.
132
 ―In this respect what has been correctly said of 
John Locke‘s view on the justice of competition, namely, that ‗it is the 
way in which competition is carried on, not its results, that count,‘ is 
generally true of the liberal conception of justice, and of what justice can 
achieve in a spontaneous order.‖133  
Though Unger and Hayek have substantially similar descriptions of the 
liberal Rule of Law, they part ways when it comes to its evaluation. For 
Hayek‘s neoliberalism, private law governance was the only way to 
guarantee a maximum of freedom and equality. For Unger and similar 
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critics, the abandonment of social organization to the private law is to 
acquiesce in persistent and entrenched hierarchies and stark inequalities;
134
 
is to embrace an institutional fetishism proclaiming the naturalness of one 
set of legal, political, and economic arrangements;
135
 is to mask the 
political choices embedded in the liberal style of property and contract 
law, and the benefits these choices typically confer on the wealthy at the 
expense of the poor;
136
 is to indulge a fantasy in which the judiciary‘s job 
of ascertaining the Rule of Law is any less subject to political and moral 
capture than the legislature‘s job of rule creation;137 is to pretend that the 
courts are somehow less arms of the state than other government 
agencies.
138
  As Morris Cohen once wrote, ―in actual life real freedom to 
do anything, in art as in politics, depends upon acceptance of the rules of 
our enterprise.‖139 
To follow Hayek down his road is also to mistakenly substitute the 
notion of technical expertise in the administration of the Rule of Law for 
the distributional nature of policy choice.
140
 In a recent essay attacking the 
use of property rights as a background rule for economic development, 
David Kennedy suggested that a Hayekian advocacy in favor of ―clear and 
strong property rights‖ fails to understand the highly disaggregated and 
stratified nature of property law regimes that exist in the industrialized 
states.
141
 ―Property in a market economy has no ideal form separate from 
the warp and woof of social and economic struggle in that society. Before 
‗property rights‘ can be strong or weak, they must be allocated and 
defined—a process which in every Western society has been inseparable 
from struggles over political and social objectives.‖142 In making this 
argument plain, Kennedy cites several examples of contested choices over 
different kinds of property regime from the choices to empower women or 
 
 
 134. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 16, at 17. 
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PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914). Robert L. 
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Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Morris Cohen, Property and 
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 27 (1927).  
 137. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (2005). 
 138. Mark Tushnet & Gary Peller, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 
791–98 (2004). 
 139. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, supra note 136, at 591.  
 140. David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57. 
 141. David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic 
Development (Brown University–Law, Social Thought & Global Governance Research Paper No. 1, 
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corporations to independently inherit and transfer property, to choices to 
terminate the rights of serfs to the commons in favor of yeoman rights to 
enclosed grazing lands, to choices about the allocation of water rights in 
the American west, to choices over what should constitute ―fair use‖ in the 
context of intellectual property debates.
143
 In these situations and many 
more, which set of answers will be ―strong and clear‖? In every case, the 
condition of any given property regime will always bear the marks of the 
political debates in which they were forged. ―Consequently, property 
rights are less a legal ‗system‘ than a historical record of winners, losers 
and social accommodation in economic and political struggles over a 
nation‘s direction. In this sense, neo-liberal orthodoxy is wrong to suggest 
that the establishment of property rights of a particular kind is a pre-
condition to a market economy.‖144 
Another typical problem associated with liberal property rights, and 
also articulated in Kennedy‘s piece, is the critique of a determinate 
relationship between public and private law. As Hayek made clear, the 
liberal style rests on a strong sense in which property rights (and private 
law more generally) preexist the regulatory law of the state. But when we 
take Hayek seriously, and find that property and contract have no meaning 
until backed with the coercive power of the state, little ground is left to 
stand upon in which the Rule of Law is understood as somehow less an act 
of state than some bureaucrat‘s administrative decision. As Kennedy 
explains, ―property rights are, in the end, only as strong as one‘s ability to 
bring the state into play as their enforcer.‖145 Hayek would be hard pressed 
to disagree. But disagree he would with a third problem: ―[I]t is simply 
meaningless to say that property rights in general are ‗strong‘ or ‗clear‘ 
without specifying just who ought to have a strong entitlement against 
whom or for just whom the application of the state‘s enforcement power 
ought to be clear and predictable in what circumstances.‖146 When it is 
remembered that Property law creates rights and duties between people, 
and not relationships between people and things, it is easier to focus on the 
fact that strong rights entail strong duties, and the process of economic 
development inevitably requires political choices about who gets those 
rights, and who will be held to corresponding duties. As Unger put it, 
―[T]he facilitative devices of contract and private law will be used by 
those who, in a sense, are already organized. The organized can find in 
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their legally sanctioned association reinforcement for their pre-existing 
advantage.‖147 The choice, as a consequence, is whether and where the 
development expert wishes to facilitate opportunity for advantage—a 
choice that cannot be avoided when establishing the background rules of 
property and contract.  
Hayek‘s Rule of Law is central to the neoliberal style in a way that it 
was not for the modern style. To be sure, the modern style advocates the 
benefits of an expansive legal system, but it is less concerned about a strict 
relationship between a legal core called the Rule of Law and a body of 
regulations threatening to ―plan‖ or ―intervene.‖ In fact, the modern style 
intentionally blurs this distinction. After the neoliberal revival, a crisp 
image of property, contract, and constitutionalism replaced the distributive 
functionalism and process-oriented jurisprudence of the prior 
generation.
148
  
But it would be a mistake to assume that this shift represented a simple 
substitution of ―conservative‖ policies in exchange for ―liberal‖ ones. The 
forces pushing the new view of ―Rule of Law‖149 and development came 
at once from a burgeoning human rights movement on the one hand,
150
 and 
the free marketers associated with the Washington Consensus on the 
other.
151
 In both cases, the common effect was to produce a view of 
economic development that required the establishment of private rights 
guarded by an overarching constitutional order. The difference consisted 
simply in which rights, and which order. Nevertheless, and despite this 
confluence, the clear weight of law and development reform in this period 
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sat in favor of private law over public. After Reagan and Thatcher, private 
law ruled.
152
 
The new view of law attended a new view of economics. The problem, 
according to this view, had not been with market failure, but government 
failure, i.e. the public sector had become overextended, led astray by the 
allure of bad economics (big pushes, etc.), and was generally in the 
business of creating economic distortions that had the effect of promoting 
systemic inefficiencies. The thinking behind this reversal should be 
familiar: monetarist policy, radiating out of its center at the University of 
Chicago,
153
 regarded government regulation as naturally at odds with the 
principles of freedom and justice, understood the primary role of 
government to be a protector of property rights, believed in a strong 
relationship between market rationality and the role of prices in mobilizing 
and allocating resources, and sought the elimination of all barriers to free 
trade, the privatization of industry, and the implementation of special 
kinds of loans to the Third World trading cash for commitments to battle 
inflation, corruption, rent-seeking, and so forth.
154
  
 
 
 152. Among the most influential texts on the importance of the common law is Richard Posner‘s 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). For critical responses, see Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, 
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Some neoliberal stylists believed that by using law and politics—and 
an enormous amount of political pressure via the World Bank and IMF—
developed countries could force open the borders of the Third World; 
structure its internal markets through the deployment of Western-style 
bank systems, insurance plans, and commercial, corporate, intellectual 
property, and securities law; and pry domestic producers off of their state-
sponsored dependencies. Local industry would be forced to compete, and 
ultimately thrive.
155
 The keener among them, like Hernando de Soto, also 
knew that all of these efforts were, in geological terms, secondary.
156
 In his 
influential work THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, de Soto asked what could be 
made of the enormous failure of the developing world to modernize? The 
―mystery‖ could be explained away in two words: property rights. ―Why 
has the genesis of capital become such a mystery? Why have the rich 
nations of the world, so quick with their economic advice, not explained 
how indispensable formal property is to capital formation?‖157 The answer 
was that for too long, people had looked at houses or lakes as natural 
things, and not as commodities. For too long, people had not taken the 
imaginative step of seeing a house or a lake as energy waiting to be 
tapped, waiting to be turned into a value.
158
 
After extensive research throughout the developing world, de Soto was 
convinced that the problem of development was centered precisely here, in 
the problem of property rights. The world was ready for ―take-off,‖ but it 
was law, or rather the lack thereof, that kept most of the world in poverty. 
It wasn‘t that people didn‘t have property, but that they did not have their 
property recorded in the legal system. If one‘s house is not properly 
recorded, de Soto explained, that house could not then take on its critical 
function as a capital asset. And without capital, development would 
remain a dream. As de Soto suggested:  
In the West, this formal property system begins to process assets 
into capital by describing and organizing the most economically and 
 
 
government failures, and not failures in the market. Particularly, the problem with large state 
apparatuses was that they tended to create windfalls of unearned income in the private sector, 
facilitating the weakening of industry and its dependence on governmental subsidies. This is what 
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socially useful aspects about assets, preserving this information in a 
recording system—as insertions in a written ledger or a blip on a 
computer disk—and then embodying them in a title. A set of 
detailed and precise legal rules governs this entire process. . . . They 
capture and organize the potential value of an asset and so allow us 
to control it. Property is the realm where we identify and explore 
assets, combine them, and link them to other assets. The formal 
property system is capital‘s hydroelectric plant. This is the place 
where capital is born.
159
 
2. Neoliberal Constitutionalism 
In the classic liberal style of framing the relation between state and 
market, property and contract rights are viewed as constitutive of market 
society. Without a properly legalized system of property and contract, 
markets can‘t happen. As Locke explained in his Second Treatise, 
however, private law wasn‘t enough to make the market. What was also 
needed was a constitutional government, the chief end of which was the 
protection of property rights from both private infringement and arbitrary 
interference on the part of the state. Consequently, classic liberal legalism 
demands a strong form of property and contract rights and a constitutional 
guarantee for the maintenance of those rights.
160
 While liberal legalism in 
the neoliberal mode doesn‘t involve as crude a sense about 
constitutionalism, Hayek makes it clear enough that Locke‘s idea was 
basically correct. 
In the context of law and development, the constitutional layer is 
arguably provided by the involvement of international financial 
institutions. As Danny Nicol has suggested,  
[T]he transnational constitution can be perceived as a kind of 
insurance policy guaranteeing the preservation of a particular 
variety of capitalism. Its object is to lock in place a system of 
privitisation and commercial liberty, so that things will not change 
very much when new governments are elected. Thus the new 
constitutional law serves to guard against the possibility that future 
governments might abandon the creed of private enterprise.
161
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For some, this insurance policy is available for inspection in the work of 
the WTO. While Nicol and others are clearly opposed to the neoliberal 
emphasis on property rights complemented by the emerging idea that 
international law should provide a constitutional scheme for the guarantee 
of free competition in the global economy, others, like Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, view this idea in a more favorable light. 
The perspective that underlines Petersmann‘s approach is that there is 
an ideological alliance between the agents of international human rights 
law and trade law that has long gone unnoticed.
162
 Petersmann has argued 
that ―in order to [be] democratically acceptable, global integration law 
(e.g. in the WTO) must pursue not only ‗economic efficiency‘ but also 
‗democratic legitimacy‘ and ‗social justice‘ as defined by human 
rights.‖163 This perception is part of a larger project of Petersmann‘s, in 
which he has suggested that the WTO should constitutionalize along the 
lines of the European Union and integrate human rights law with the 
machinery of free trade and commerce.
164
 The idea is to essentially marry 
human rights and market freedoms in a way so as to create a new liberal 
bargain of pre-commitments: domestic entities will give up their 
interventionist rights in good faith on the belief that the upper-level 
constitutional commitments to economic rights will be for the greatest 
benefit. This scheme is not only justified by economic thinking, but by the 
moral, democratic, and constitutional legitimacy of human rights law as 
well. 
According to Petersmann, the EU offers the world—and especially the 
WTO—an illuminating example of how human rights and market 
freedoms are inherently dependent on one another, and how they should 
be fused. The lessons from European integration for the WTO flow from 
what Petersmann calls the functional theory of integration: ―the view that 
economic market integration can progressively promote peaceful 
cooperation and the rule of law beyond economic areas, thereby enabling 
more comprehensive and more effective protection of human rights than 
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has been possible in traditional state-centred international law.‖165 The 
benefits of this integration work not only for human rights, but also the 
establishment of human rights like the rights to property and contract that 
go a long way towards nourishing the foundations for successful 
markets.
166
 ―Wherever freedom and property rights are protected, 
individuals start investing, producing and exchanging goods, services and 
income.‖167  
These lessons point Petersmann to the conclusion that ―UN human 
rights law and WTO rules offer mutually beneficial synergies for 
rendering human rights and the social functions and democratic legitimacy 
of the emerging global integration law more effective.‖168 The way 
forward is to realize a ―Global Compact,‖ initiated by the United Nations, 
which would demand of all international organizations a binding 
cognizance of ―human rights, the rule of law, democracy and ‗good 
governance.‘‖169 To this extent, the WTO appellate body would come to 
―protect human rights in the trade policy area.‖170 
3. Conflicting Considerations at the World Bank 
Just as consensus emerged in the late 1970s and ‗80s that the first wave 
of development economics had been a failure, so did neoliberal practice 
come under similar scrutiny in the years around the turn of the Twenty 
First Century.
171
 Unlike prior moments in the movement, however, faith in 
one style of law and economics failed to transfer to some better rival. 
Instead, the current phase of thinking has accepted, again, that markets 
cannot supply the conditions of economic success. Regulation is 
important, too, though, the contemporary expert will admit, markets are 
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also key. Property rights are essential, but so is democracy. Free trade is a 
major engine of growth, but tariffs can be critical in many areas. There are 
certain principles, such as competition, which consistently generate the 
best results, but it must also be admitted that there is no single plan, and 
that every region may call for a special solution. Development 
practitioners have returned to the idea that ―development‖ must mean 
something other than efficient business practice, and that it should include 
an idea of development as freedom.
172
 Thankfully, promotion of the Rule 
of Law bestows blessings on both those that are in pursuit of liberal 
democracy and the liberal market. Taken together, few practitioners today 
have kept faith with either the modern or neoliberal styles of law and 
economics, and have turned instead to a crude pragmatism.
173
 The way 
forward, many today would agree, lies in the balancing of these often 
conflicting considerations.
174
 
Among the most influential locations for work on Rule of Law 
development is the World Bank, which at the Bank has been big business. 
Over the past decade, the Bank has published several major reports 
outlining its financial activities related to the Rule of Law, and the 
rationale for its commitment.
175
 Among these is the International Financial 
Corporation‘s annual report, Doing Business, the purpose of which is to 
―provide an objective basis for understanding and improving the 
regulatory environment for business.‖176 The reasoning behind the project 
is that emerging industries in the developing world require a set of good 
rules and institutional arrangements, which necessarily shape the 
background of successful economic activity. These ―good‖ rules include 
―rules that establish and clarify property rights and reduce the costs of 
resolving disputes, rules that increase the predictability of economic 
interactions and rules that provide contractual partners with core 
protections against abuse.‖177 The project‘s method is to track the 
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AMARTYA SEN, THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1993); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011). 
 173. David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, supra note 57, at 152. 
 174. For an interesting discussion on the nature of the law and development field, its past, and its 
future, see Colloquy, Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, 104 NW. U.L. REV 
COLLOQUY 164 (2009). Though there is hardly consensus on what way forward might be counted as 
the best, there is no doubt that many scholars are experiencing the feeling of being at a crossroads. For 
discussion, of the ―what works‖ approach, see Mariana Prado, Should We Adopt a “What Works” 
Approach in Law and Development?, 104 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 174 (2009).  
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operation of such rules through the quantification of ten indicators, 
including (1) starting a business, (2) dealing with construction permits, 
(3) employing workers, (4) registering property, (5) getting credit, 
(6) protecting investors, (7) paying taxes, (8) trading across borders, 
(9) enforcing contracts, and (10) closing a business.
178
 As a reflection of 
its modest legal pragmatism, the project is neither focused on more or less 
regulation as necessarily an indicator of economic growth or inefficient 
rent-seeking: ―some Doing Business indicators give a higher score for 
more regulation, such as stricter disclosure requirements in related-party 
transactions. Some give a higher score for a simplified way of 
implementing existing regulation, such as completing business start-up 
formalities in a one-stop shop.‖179 Similarly, the project has discarded the 
idea that there is a single, linear route to developmental progress. Quoting 
Colombia‘s minister of commerce, the 2010 report explains that economic 
development is ―not like baking a cake. . . . But we can take certain things, 
certain key lessons, and apply those lessons and see how they work in our 
environment.‖180 
In 2010, the Doing Business report suggested that certain reforms had 
begun to crystallize.
181
 As a threshold matter, the report found that those 
countries most successful in instituting regulatory reform were those 
committed to a large-scale increase in the competitiveness of their local 
firms. This may sound tautological, but the report goes on to say that the 
most successful states, like Singapore and China, continue to ―push 
forward and stay proactive‖ by following de Soto‘s recommendations to 
make business simpler and easier to begin. Another common element of 
success is comprehensiveness: ―Over the past 5 years Colombia, Egypt, 
Georgia, FYR Macedonia, Mauritius and Rwanda each implemented at 
least 19 reforms. . . . This broad approach increases the chances of success 
and impact.‖182 This ―comprehensive‖ approach includes a lowering of the 
cost of entry for foreign competitors through free trade.
183
 Successful 
reformers are also ―inclusive,‖ meaning that they are eager to establish 
private-public partnerships and gravitate towards long-term plans.
184
 
Another Bank project relevant to the development of the Rule of Law 
is its compendium of all Bank financed activities in ―justice reform,‖ 
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Initiatives in Justice Reform.
185
 The rationale for the Bank‘s commitment 
to the Rule of Law is stated at the beginning of the report: The Bank‘s 
mission is to reduce worldwide poverty, and the Rule of Law is seen as a 
―fundamental element of economic development and poverty 
reduction.‖186 The Rule of Law is both an ―end in itself, but also a means 
of facilitating the achievement of other development objectives.‖187 ―This 
focus reflects an understanding by the Bank and its member countries that 
the rule of law and justice are crucial to both growth and equity in 
countries throughout the world.‖188 The Bank‘s belief in the law‘s 
constitutive power is rooted in data. Initiatives cites confirming statistics 
from the Bank‘s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment indicators, 
the World Bank Institute‘s governance indicators, the Doing Business 
indicators mentioned above, and the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey, as all supporting the view that law reform is a 
necessary ingredient in establishing more efficient business practices.
189
 
Initiatives also cites the Rule of Law as an important economic aid insofar 
as corruption is a major obstacle to the development of market society.
190
 
―Good Governance‖ are the watchwords.191  
Another leading source of thinking about Rule of Law development is 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and in particular, its 
Vice President for Studies, Thomas Carothers. In a recent follow-up to his 
influential ―The Rule of Law Revival,‖192 Carothers criticizes 
intergovernmental institutions and domestic aid agencies for taking too 
soft a view of what the Rule of Law actually requires in its 
implementation.
193
 In Carothers‘ view, Rule of Law advocates, which he 
believes to be almost everybody, everywhere, tend to make several kinds 
of mistakes. First, the widespread consensus on the political and economic 
benefits of Rule of Law development is an empty one. Even if it is 
assumed that leaders are serious about implementing a legal development 
 
 
 185. WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 2009 (2008). The 2009 Initiatives report 
outlines three central themes of justice reform. First is ―court management and performance.‖ Second 
is ―access to justice,‖ which is, as it sounds, the effort to make courts more accessible to the people. 
Third is ―legal information and education.‖ Id. at 5. 
 186. Id. at 2. 
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 191. For discussion, see JAMES THUO GHATTI, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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strategy, which is often a poor assumption, it must be recognized that 
advocates often have wildly different ideas about just which kinds of rules 
they want to transplant and entrench.
194
 Perhaps they are classic liberal 
property rights; perhaps they are rights enumerated in the United Nations 
Declaration on Minority Rights. The fact of this disparity empties much of 
the meaning of a ―consensus‖ about the Rule of Law. Second, Carothers 
identifies a trend by ―authoritarian‖ government to depoliticize their Rule 
of Law commitments.
195
 Referring to the public law constitutionalism of 
the 1990s, Carothers pointed out how Rule of Law projects converged 
with democratic reform projects, producing an idea of law with 
substantive, welfarist commitments. More recently, advocacy for the Rule 
of Law from countries like Russia and China have delinked the Rule of 
Law, and especially the idea of ―rights,‖ from democratic reform. The 
upshot is a Rule of Law bereft of its politically desirable spillover 
effects.
196
 A third mistake that Carothers sees gaining in prevalence is the 
idea that the Rule of Law can be grown organically if only certain 
institutional elements are put in place.
197
 The idea that a liberal legal 
system can flower after a little soil and sunlight are added, Carothers 
explained, was debunked long ago, only to be revived again in the twenty-
first century.
198
 If Rule of Law development is to succeed, these and other 
mistakes need to be addressed.
199
 
 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 53–54.  
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 55–59. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Carothers‘ critiques might resemble the arguments surveyed in Part II in association with 
what I termed a ―critical‖ style. To be sure, Carothers‘ and his colleagues‘ work is certainly critical, 
but it is more appropriately situated amidst the pragmatism of a post-neoliberal style than the anti-
liberalism of critical theory. For example, Carothers emphasizes the variability of Rule of Law work, 
but appears to assume that ―liberal‖ and ―conservative‖ ideas about the Rule of Law are determinate. 
He emphasizes the political nature of Rule of Law work, but cabins political effects to the public 
sector, lamenting the loss of democratic development while neglecting the distributional effects of a 
classic liberal common law regime. He points out that the Rule of Law cannot have an organic, 
evolutionary quality about it, but his text still seems constrained by a set of disappointments that have 
produced a vision of law funneled by what Unger has called the convergence thesis: due to the steady 
march of institutional progress (and decline), we face a very limited set of choices about what law 
might become. Whatever the case may ultimately be, and whether Carnegie scholars are better 
understood as eclectic pragmatists or anti-liberal critics, the fact is that in the contemporary period of 
thinking about the role of law in economic development, most experts have lost faith in either the 
classic or modern liberal styles of imaging the proper balance between state and market action. The 
same holds true for constitutional scholars thinking about the same question in the context of 
constitutional state action doctrine.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
44 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:1 
 
 
 
 
C. The Experimental Path 
In the discussion above, legal pragmatism was introduced as a way of 
understanding the relationship between the neoformalist and balancing 
tendencies that Duncan Kennedy has attributed to contemporary legal 
thought. In particular, the culprit was a distinct breed known as ―eclectic 
pragmatism.‖ In addition to eclectics, however, there are two other forms 
of legal pragmatism on the contemporary scene, economic pragmatism and 
experimental pragmatism. I will pass over economic pragmatism for the 
sake of space, but do wish to note that it is a style of pragmatism that 
places a tremendous amount of weight on the norm of allocative efficiency 
while at the same time avoiding being just another name for neoclassical 
law and economics. The champion of this style is Richard Posner. The 
focus of this section, however, is experimentalism, and it takes a recent 
text from William Simon and Charles Sabel as representative. The relevant 
questions are (1) whether experimental pragmatism is indigenous to 
contemporary legal thought or better understood as a revival of modern 
liberalism, and (2) whether experimental pragmatism offers anything 
worthwhile in the context of development economics.
200
 
In their most recent work on the topic, Sabel and Simon situate 
experimental pragmatists against two rival styles of law and policy 
work.
201
 On one side is the well-known ―minimalism‖ of Sunstein & 
Associates
202
 and on the other is what Sabel and Simon call the ―command 
 
 
 200. For the purposes of this discussion, I am limiting the coverage here to Sabel & Simon, 
Minimalism and Experimentalism, supra note 6, and Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights, 
supra note 6. 
 201. ―Experimental Pragmatism‖ seems like a label that is perfectly consistent with Sabel and 
Simon‘s usage here. My suspicion is that their main complaint would be that the label is redundant 
since all pragmatism is experimentalist. My response there would simply be to the abundance of work 
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misused. My intention here is most certainly not to claim that Sunstein is actually and truly a 
pragmatist. It is rather that scholars like Sunstein self-identify with the term, and have enough in 
common with a rough and vernacular sense of pragmatism to justify calling them pragmatists as such. 
What is necessary, however, in the process of diluting the name ―pragmatism‖ is to make sure that we 
carefully distinguish its strains, since they at least claim to be different creatures. There is a very large 
literature here. Sample works include Amy J Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, 
Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008); Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, A Constitution 
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles Sabel and William Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); 
Symposium, Symposium on New Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227.  
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and control‖ model of administration.203 Sunstein‘s minimalism is a stock 
example of the eclectic brand of contemporary legal pragmatism, and I 
will use ―minimalism‖ and ―eclecticism‖ interchangeably. While Sunstein 
seems to, occasionally, write more like an economic pragmatist than an 
eclectic pragmatist, regardless of where we put him there seems little 
doubt that he is deploying a contemporary form of legal pragmatism that is 
not experimental pragmatism. The command and control model, against 
which Sabel and Simon contrast both minimalism and experimentalism, is 
similar to the modern liberalism of Duncan Kennedy‘s period of social 
legal thought. Thus, I use ―command and control,‖ ―modern liberalism,‖ 
and ―social legal thought‖ interchangeably.  
For Sabel and Simon, minimalism is a new style of administration 
forged in the context of contemporary legal thought as a corrective for the 
failures of the mid-century welfare state.
204
 Though they do take 
minimalism as heavily focused on the neoclassical conception of 
efficiency analysis and the advantages of market simulation, Sabel and 
Simon do not equate it either with the neoliberal apparatus that emerged in 
the 1980s. Minimalism stands for something other than the free-market 
orientation of neoliberalism or the ―command and control‖ ethos of 
modern liberalism, trying to take the good from both and shuffling their 
insights as needed.
205
 Minimalism is skeptical about both the wisdom of 
leaving too much power and discretion to clearly irrational market actors, 
but also leaving too much discretion to regulators who are clearly subject 
to capture. Markets fail, governments fail, and minimalism is set to offer a 
balanced approach to governance that understands both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the modern and neoliberal styles.
206
 Without transcending 
either, it recombines both in an attraction to the status quo, ―static 
efficiency,‖ more of a market-based approach to welfare, and more of a 
government-based approach to nudging market choices in the ―right‖ 
direction.  
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 204. Id. at 57. 
 205. Id. at 56–60. 
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1. The Basics 
Sabel and Simon situate experimental pragmatism along two 
dimensions, ―Regulation‖ and ―Social Welfare,‖ which might grossly be 
characterized as proxies for the ―form‖ and ―substance‖ of 
experimentalism, respectively. In contrast to the minimalist habit of using 
efficiency as a chief norm in the crafting of regulatory regimes, 
experimental pragmatists are keener on regimes guided by a premium on 
reliability. In the literature on management theory, reliability is a term of 
art, involving an administrative outlook where the hope is for managers 
and workers to operate in an atmosphere where learning and adaptation to 
changing circumstances is constantly fostered. Conceivably inefficient or 
nonoptimal eventualities are regarded as opportunities for growth, and the 
emergence of problem areas or defects are absorbed into a perpetual 
process of reassessment and reappraisal. 
Sabel and Simon appropriately recognize that some might counter that 
reliability concerns are simply concerns of a more broadly conceived idea 
about efficiency. But as Sabel and Simon explain, there does seem to be a 
real tension between experimentalist techniques and efficiency techniques 
to the extent that the economic pragmatist will be preoccupied with strong 
market signals like price, where the experimental pragmatist is looking at 
a broad spectrum of signals, including those that are weak, subtle, and 
deserve on-the-spot complex discretion. If too much attention is paid to 
price, the focus on efficiency can undermine a regulatory framework of 
reliability. For the efficiency-minded, cost-benefit analysis and regimes 
that create mock-markets, like tradable emission programs, the main driver 
is a static assessment of price. Instead of a default openness to a host of 
varying sorts of signals and norms, the efficiency paradigm generates a 
tunnel vision for simplicity and short-term costs, which Sabel and Simon 
suggest is ultimately counterproductive. Experimental pragmatists believe 
that our broadly defined goals, whatever they might be, will best be served 
though complex responses with a view for the long-run, and not the 
reverse. 
As we saw in the work of Lasswell and McDougal, this kind of big 
picture view is explicitly rooted in John Dewey‘s pragmatism. They write:  
Experimentalism takes its name from John Dewey‘s political 
philosophy, which aims to precisely accommodate the continuous 
change and variation that we see as the most pervasive challenge of 
current public problems. Policies should be ―experimental in the 
sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-
equipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 47 
 
 
 
 
upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of 
observed consequences.‖207  
Sabel and Simon understand this prime directive to involve a perspective 
that, at bottom, rejects the idea that regulation works best through the 
articulation of clear goals and the aggressive implementation of those 
goals. The focus instead is on Dewey‘s notion of inquiry: the experimental 
pragmatist is not too worried about precisely defined goals precisely 
because our goals only come into focus in the actual process of doing, and 
not before the doing has been done. It‘s just a mistake to set out a goal of 
optimizing a particular industry since the notion of optimizing may very 
well fool the regulator into chasing chimerical ideas instead of realizing, in 
the day-to-day, the intertwined twists and turns of crisis and victory. Sabel 
and Simon write: ―In the realm of uncertainty, policy aims cannot be 
extensively defined in advance of implementation; they have to be 
discovered in the course of problem solving.‖208  
For the experimental pragmatist, following Dewey, the first lesson 
requires the establishment of a very broad framework goal, but a goal that 
must be open to constant revision. That is, the goal should be allowed to 
change after we come to understand the goal as it seems to present itself in 
the march of the routine. Next, our policymaker or legal analyst at the 
center will want to devolve as much discretion as possible to local actors, 
since it‘s in the local that the routine is most clearly understood. The local 
actors produce, record, compile, and report results as regularly as possible 
back to the center, and together the local actors and the administrators at 
the center coordinate and evaluate. The framework goals themselves are 
periodically evaluated in light of the process, helping dissolve the 
distinction between the initial ―value‖ and the ―facts‖ to which the value 
are ostensibly applied—a distinction key to the work of economic 
pragmatists. 
In the context of regulation, Sabel and Simon suggest that this 
approach involves a structural design in which all the players, whether 
public or private, whether at the center or periphery, are induced into a 
culture of self-reporting and self-critique which will excel in the on-going 
work of getting done what we want to get done that is absent in the 
mainstream.
209
 Another advantage is that it avoids the critique of the 
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welfare state which pointed to the inefficiency of the bureaucrat, 
ultimately unable to get her hands on the information relevant to the 
deployment of her apparent expertise. She could never know the market as 
well as the market knew itself. In contrast, the experimentalist lives in a 
sea of data—it just keeps on flowing in, flowing out, frothing about: the 
local is on a par with the center here, as opposed to the old idea of the 
interventionist state.
210
  
In the context of social welfare, Sabel and Simon push the conversation 
away from the form of rule-making and towards its content.
211
 The 
minimalist apparatus of experimental pragmatism will be helpful in certain 
issue areas, Sabel and Simon suggest, ―[b]ut the approach seems 
implausible or question begging with respect to many of the most 
important problems.‖212 The crux of the assertion is that eclectic 
pragmatists have failed to adequately take stock of the basic social 
changes in the playing field over the last half-century. In order to properly 
figure out the role of government in the distribution of wealth and 
resources (if that‘s even the right question), experimentalists are in tune 
with the realities of 21st century social structures in ways that minimalists 
are not. 
The reasons for this are plain. The minimalist approach to social 
welfare involves the same approach as it did to regulation: it is eclectic, 
and based on a scheme of constantly recombining the assumptions of 
modern liberals and neoliberals. The minimalist toolkit, as it were, ends 
around 1980. To be sure, the minimalist approach of eclectic pragmatists 
represents an alternative to the command and control model of modern 
liberalism, as well as the libertarian feel of the Washington Consensus, but 
what is new about it is the eclectic mixing of the ideas—not the arrival of 
a new image of market-state relations. 
According to Sabel and Simon, the substantive proposals of 
experimental pragmatists with regard to the proper role of market and state 
are not dated to the 1980s, but not because a new idea about political 
economy has emerged. If this were the case, it might be an example of the 
old-fashioned distinction between fact and value, goal and 
implementation. Instead, experimental pragmatists are current in a way 
that eclectics are not because eclectic pragmatists have sought to adapt the 
assumptions of the New Deal and the Washington Consensus to the 
present, instead of leaving those assumptions behind in favor of finding 
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our answers in the real world of problem-solving. For example, Sabel and 
Simon explain how the basic points of departure for New Deal thinking 
involved an architecture of social insurance built around tax and transfer 
cash distributions and framed in terms of market-labor relationships.
213
 
The idea was to target the everyman—an able-bodied English-speaking 
white male with a traditional nuclear family tracked into a job in which 
he‘d stay for forty years. Instead of grasping the fundamental changes in 
society with respect to what kinds of people are now able to work, where 
they work, in what languages they work, and so on, Sabel and Simon 
argue that minimalists have ―sought to preserve the New Deal emphasis on 
standardized, rule-defined cash benefits while broadening the scope of 
both the social insurance and public assistance programs.‖214 Minimalists, 
on this view, are behind the times. 
In order to make law more functional and better attuned to social 
needs, experimental pragmatists are eager to do away with presumptions 
from the past. The policy approach of the experimentalist should be on the 
lookout for changing trends and incorporate a close-up focus on ―highly 
individuated planning, pervasive policy measurement, and efforts to 
aggregate and disseminate information about effective practices.‖215 The 
mechanism, as already stated, is public participation. In a way that 
distances itself from the pessimism of behavioral economics and 
resembles the literature on deliberative democracy, experimental 
pragmatists seek out operational plans in which local communities are 
leading the way in figuring out what is working out through public 
sharing, thinking, and critiquing. These local efforts need to be 
harmonized through a central system, but instead of the center giving the 
periphery a set of rules about the role of the state in the market, local 
groups should be always thinking about what is working best, for whom, 
and where. 
2. Experimentalism Considered 
So where does Sabel and Simon‘s discussion fit into Duncan 
Kennedy‘s map of American Legal Thought? As I have previously argued, 
minimalism is a stock example of eclectic pragmatism, which is a 
motivating property in the ―Third Globalization‖ of contemporary legal 
thought. Sabel and Simon would likely agree that minimalism is a 
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contemporary posture, since they expressly articulate it as a current 
alternative to the command and control style of modern liberalism. 
Similarly, if they were to accept the premises of the Three Globalizations 
story, they would also accept the idea that experimental pragmatism fits in 
the contemporary mode, given that they see experimentalism as the other 
current alternative.  
Just being an alternative to modern liberalism, however, is not enough 
to merit a place on Kennedy‘s map. To geth there, we need to see some 
combination of neoformalism and a balancing approach. As I have argued 
elsewhere, eclectic pragmatism, including Sunstein‘s version of it, does 
seem to capture a sensibility in which the jurist or policy expert is 
encouraged to shift between form and function, truth and consequence, in 
whatever way appears to fit the current need. What is new here is the 
accepted nature of the eclecticism—where at one point we may have 
identified a dominant faith in an individual will theory, or an expert 
bureaucracy, we now have faith only in the mantra of ―doing what works.‖ 
While this may be a fair description of the minimalism in Sabel and 
Simon‘s article, does it also capture experimentalism? Are experimental 
pragmatists similarly committed to a consequentialist view of 
neoformalist/balancing techniques? And if so, what distinguishes them 
from the eclectics? 
Of course, an articulation of just what it is that distinguishes 
experimentalists from eclectics was the whole point of Sabel and Simon‘s 
article. To be sure, there can be no doubt that there are real and meaningful 
differences here, and if it were put to a vote between the two I would 
certainly be a card-carrying member of the experimentalist party. But 
despite the operational contrasts, experimentalism and eclecticism seem 
anchored in a broadly similar orientation that becomes more and more 
clear when we take the birds-eye view. Consider the following. 
First, Sabel and Simon appear intent on presenting experimentalism as 
an administrative style that has already been planted. It‘s not a utopian 
vision of a world yet to be—in fact, they argue that there has been ―a 
fundamental policy reorientation along experimentalist lines in the United 
States, the European Union, and elsewhere since the 1990s. . . . Some of 
the Obama Administration‘s most important initiatives, including the Food 
Safety Modernization Act and the Race to the Top education program, can 
only be understood in experimentalist terms.‖216 Indeed, there is a growing 
list of examples of experimentalist work in the world to which Sabel and 
 
 
 216. Id. at 55–56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 51 
 
 
 
 
Simon are supplementing, not starting from scratch. From Toyota to the 
US Navy, EPA‘s Project Excel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
developments in child welfare reform to information trading at the WTO, 
experimentalist approaches seem everywhere.
217
 Of course, Sabel and 
Simon don‘t want to go too far, and they are sure to remind that 
experimentalism is in its infancy. It‘s young and unproven, but operating 
in the here and now. 
It is in this sense that minimalism and experimentalism therefore share 
a common ground in that they are both a part of the contemporary 
landscape—they are both practical, applicable modes of administration in 
the second decade of the 21st century. Consequently, as experimental 
approaches become more prevalent, they will likely take more of the 
blame going round, of which there is plenty to share. If this is right, and 
experimentalism is a meaningful aspect of contemporary legal thought, 
then an initial complaint might hold that Kennedy‘s picture of the Third 
Globalization is incomplete. If the Third Globalization is a confluence of 
neoformalist techniques and balancing approaches, and experimentalism is 
something else, is the map wrong? 
I don‘t think that it is, and this leads to a second point about the 
common ground upon which eclectics and experimentalists are working. 
Sabel and Simon hammer home the idea that experimentalism is better 
than eclecticism, and in the context of minimalist style of regulation their 
chief complaint is that minimalism just doesn‘t work. They take efficiency 
as the grundnorm in play, and show how in case after case a singular focus 
on efficiency, optimal performance, and the techniques that make good on 
those norms (like cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade) are poor 
performers when it comes to actually doing what the regulations hope to 
do. Sabel and Simon explain how efficiency concerns undermine the 
fruitfulness of new learning opportunities
218
 and sacrifice better results for 
quicker results,
219
 while cost-benefit analysis persistently gets the 
measurements of the costs and the benefits all wrong, or puts too much 
emphasis on centralized decision-making procedures unaccompanied by 
local assessments.
220
 Like cost-benefit analysis, Sabel and Simon see 
problems with cap-and-trade also involving workability.
221
 These 
problems, however, are problems at the margins. Sabel and Simon admit 
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that cost-benefit analysis and cap-and-trade techniques are valuable, and 
efficiency is a truly great idea, but they‘re just not as valuable as eclectics 
would like to think. 
The upshot here is that the experimentalist critique of eclectic 
proposals flows out of a set of premises shared by the eclectics. In fact, 
Sabel and Simon‘s critique appears to portray an eclecticism in itself, 
chiding minimalists for being too preoccupied with a single norm—
efficiency—at the expense of other norms which might also be valuable, if 
not more so. Indeed, as discussed above, a strong sense of eclectic 
pragmatism avoids any singular faith in a given approach, and to the 
extent minimalism really is in orbit around one vision of the market, this 
would suggest a more appropriate labeling of economic pragmatism, if not 
the neoliberalism of the Chicago School. Experimentalism, on the other 
hand, is safely situated in the Third Globalization given its attraction to a 
bevy of norms, including efficiency, at least in the context of this one text. 
Remember, theirs is not a critique of efficiency, it is a complement to it. 
A third point regarding Sabel and Simon‘s mapping of 
experimentalism, minimalism, and modern liberalism has to do with what 
they see as the proper fit between law and policy, and the social world 
they are meant to govern. Sabel and Simon understand ―the most 
pervasive challenge of current public problems‖ to be ―the continuous 
change and variation‖ in society,222 and that ―experimentalist regimes are 
especially well suited for circumstances in which effective public 
intervention requires local variation and adaptation to changing 
circumstances.‖223 Minimalists, Sabel and Simon argue, continue to 
operate on the old and outdated assumption of modern liberalism (and/or 
neoliberalism), while experimentalism is precisely fashioned to craft an 
administrative style that makes law responsive to today‘s social needs.  
It is here in Sabel and Simon‘s critique of minimalist social welfare 
proposals that doubts creep in as to whether experimental pragmatism is 
indeed a contemporary legal style. There is no doubt that an idea about 
making law responsive to social needs is an emblem of contemporary legal 
thought, but it is well known that it is here only as a relic of social legal 
thought. Indeed, it is a juristic technique that is more than a hundred years 
old at this point, and what may distinguish experimentalists is their 
somewhat neo-realist
224
 tenacity for a teleological jurisprudence. Whereas 
the fit between law and social need is a part of every serious policy 
 
 
 222. Id. at 78. 
 223. Id. at 56. 
 224. See, e.g., Symposium, Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 53 
 
 
 
 
program, experimentalists like Sabel and Simon don‘t see it as just a 
―part‖—it‘s key. 
This central focus on changing social circumstance demands 
cognizance of the relation between experimental pragmatism, realism, and 
the sorts of functionalist projects found in the work of post-realists like 
Lasswell and McDougal.
225
 There‘s no basis for thinking that the work of 
Sabel and Simon is merely a rerun of the work of Lasswell and McDougal, 
because it‘s clearly not. But despite the differences, they look more and 
more marginal when we focus on the nature in which both scholarly duos 
build off a strong diet of Dewey, take a complex view of the relation 
between law and politics, eschew sharply defined policy goals in favor of 
broadly stated framework goals that will be progressively defined through 
works of individual practice, and advocate the need for constant flows of 
information in an ongoing process of reappraisal. 
So what? Should the filial relation between experimental pragmatism 
and post-realist projects from the likes of Lasswell and McDougal 
encourage us to locate Sabel and Simon in the bygone era of social legal 
thought? If the experimental critique of minimalist regulation is clearly in 
the mode of the Third Globalization, and its critique of minimalist social 
welfare policy is of a piece with the Second, what to do?  
A fourth point about Sabel and Simon‘s discussion of experimentalism, 
minimalism, and modern liberalism might carry the day. In an article from 
2004, Simon discussed the relation between ―legal liberalism‖ and ―legal 
pragmatism.‖226 In the context of the mapping at work in this discussion, 
Simon appears to equate legal liberalism with modern liberalism; he 
associated it with a penchant for plaintiffs in tort and civil rights cases, 
defendants in criminal cases, a prioritization of moderate forms of equality 
and liberty, and a tendency to track the liberal-left side of the political 
spectrum.
227
 As a consequence, Simon‘s liberalism clearly does not 
include the legalism of either Locke or Hayek. As for ―legal pragmatism,‖ 
Simon means for the label to describe experimentalism, and while he does 
admit that there are various breeds, his analysis is solely focused on the 
experimental style.
228
  
Simon‘s critique of liberal legalism is slippery. Coming from a deep 
baseline in critical legal studies,
229
 there is little doubt about the 
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adversarial posture of Simon‘s pragmatism. At the same time, however, 
Simon seemed to be going out of his way to paint the critique as one 
coming from within liberalism. After surfacing some common complaints 
from critical theory, Simon distances himself from them. Noting that these 
critiques ―remain important and, on some points, powerful,‖ Simon‘s 
pragmatist approach would be ―more grounded in the basic commitments 
of political liberalism.‖230 Moving into the rest of the discussion, as a 
consequence, the reader may have expected legal pragmatism as the 
coming of something like a friendly amendment, and not as much of a 
radical overturning of liberal legalism. 
Towards the middle of the article, Simon explains his reasoning:  
At the risk of overemphasizing the contrast, I have formulated and 
organized the premises so as to emphasize their differences with 
Legal Liberalism. It is debatable whether the Legal Pragmatist 
perspective is best seen as a competitor to the Legal Liberalism that 
addresses itself to the whole field of lawyering, or rather as a 
complement that purports to be more appropriate to a range of 
situations but that concedes as a significant range to the Legal 
Liberal approach.
231
  
At the end, Simon left this relational question for another day, leaving us 
wondering whether an ultimate answer might be less useful than a 
forward-looking perspective on better discourse, whether it‘s called liberal 
or pragmatic or whatever. 
Though I do admire Simon‘s cautious tone, and appreciate the 
complicated nature of the question, I find it appropriate to come down 
with an answer here: Sabel and Simon are liberals. Now, in saying as 
much I don‘t mean to identify them necessarily as modern liberals 
working in the language of social legal thought, exiling them from the 
terrain of the Third Globalization. Not at all. What I do mean to say is that 
experimental pragmatism, like eclectic pragmatism, depends on a toolkit 
that remains entirely comprised of the stuff of classic, modern, and 
neoliberalism. If, for example, we were to join Sabel and Simon with 
Lasswell and McDougal, we would expect to see the former pair joining 
the latter pair‘s unquestionable loyalty to the modern liberal style. Sabel 
and Simon have lost faith in a single style of liberal legalism, as have all 
natives of contemporary legal thought. And yet, while they have no faith 
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in any one style, their optimism is buoyed by a belief in the power of 
deliberative democracy and the truth of the liberal, autonomous, rational 
self.  
To sum up, Sabel and Simon have argued that experimentalism is 
operational, and therefore a real administrative style in the contemporary 
scene. Of course, not everything that is happening is illustrative of 
contemporary legal thought—a great many instances are just holdovers 
from traditions of the past. But Sabel and Simon‘s claim is that it is indeed 
new, and that it is explicitly formulated as an alternative to the command 
and control style of modern liberalism. Second, the experimentalist 
critique of minimalist regulation is clearly consistent with an eclectic 
preoccupation with ―what works,‖ and for Sabel and Simon, a great deal 
of the minimalist regulatory apparatus just doesn‘t. It wasn‘t that 
efficiency concerns, cost-benefit analysis, or cap-and-trade programs 
suffered from political or philosophical defects, but rather that they didn‘t 
perform in the manner in which Sunstein & Associates would hope. Third, 
the experimentalist critique of minimalist social welfare suggested a heavy 
reliance on the jurisprudential style of social legal thought and modern 
liberalism. The reliance was so heavy, and so important, that it was 
enough to doubt whether experimentalism might be better located in the 
Second Globalization. Fourth, experimental pragmatism appears to be 
ultimately committed to liberal legalism. This commitment is not to any 
single style of liberal legalism, but rather to the common liberal 
vocabulary to be found in the langue of classical and social legal thought.  
As a consequence, I think we can reach the tentative conclusion that 
experimentalism is like minimalism in that they are both strands of the 
legal pragmatism animating so much of contemporary legal thought. This 
is a legal pragmatism that is notable for its attention to neoformalism, 
attraction to the weighing of conflicting interests, and belief in the 
combination of various styles of legal liberalism in the service of what 
works. Eclectic pragmatism, and its minimalist programs, is on all fours 
with this description. Experimental pragmatism, in contrast, favors 
function over form and deliberation over balancing. Experimentalism is 
therefore less central to the dominant conception of contemporary legal 
thought (which is a good thing for experimentalists), but indigenous to 
contemporary legal thought all the same: It has more functionalism than 
minimalism, and less formalism, but it is similarly committed to a 
pervasive if disenchanted liberalism.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was seen in some quarters as a 
final shift away from the ―free-market‖ conservativism of the Bush 
regime, if not the end of an era of neoliberalism nearly forty years old.
232
 
This shift was similarly identified in the context of international 
development policy even before President Obama‘s election, as 
disillusionment with ―shock therapy‖ programs administered by the so-
called Washington Consensus became more apparent and intense.
233
 To be 
sure, very few have suggested a wholesale return to the New Deal 
governmentalism of the mid-20th century, for as President Obama said 
himself in an eminently contemporary fashion, ―[t]he question we ask 
today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it 
works.‖234 What we are striving towards is ―a strategy no longer driven by 
ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the 
sobering facts on the ground.‖235 In fact, the suggestion that we are in the 
midst of a paradigm shift seems to take its cue from this new sense about 
pragmatism over purity, a new focus on what works, what will get the job 
done.
236
 
Veteran observers of the field seem to think as much. David Trubek, 
for example, wrote in 2006 of the mounting criticisms of the neoliberal 
policy establishment,
237
 and of how these complaints appeared to have 
―succeeded in opening up the discourse. The moment seems more open, 
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the discourse more fluid.‖238 But Trubek‘s assessment was 
characteristically cautious: ―So the question is this: in this period of 
rethinking and partial doubt, is there a real chance for the recognition of 
alternative development strategies and of very different legal paths that 
can be followed on the road to economic growth and political freedom? Is 
it possible, for example, that acceptance of pragmatism could replace faith 
in formalism . . . ?‖239 Trubek answered in the affirmative, hopefully 
seeing in the present ―a turning point, a moment in which it is possible to 
go beyond critique of orthodoxy to reconstruction.‖240  
Another well-known critic of international development discourse, 
David Kennedy, has more recently offered a similarly optimistic view of a 
new and unfolding moment.
241
 Kennedy suggests that just as a new space 
opened up after the discrediting of the first wave of development practice 
and in the Reagan-Thatcher zeitgeist, we have also witnessed a similar 
eventuality in the chastening of neoliberalism. Kennedy writes, ―When the 
unity and self-confidence of development economics ebbs, as occurred in 
the nineteen seventies and is again the case today, and the details and 
context for policy seem more salient, ideas about law and institutions often 
lie closer to the surface in discussions of development policy.‖242 The 
result, Kennedy and Trubek agree, is that a new chance is on offer in 
which previously unorthodox approaches to law, economics, and 
sociology, might find themselves, quite surprisingly, in a mainstream 
alliance. The hope for such a ―heterogenous alliance,‖ Kennedy explains, 
is for it ―to expand the potential for institutional, doctrinal and policy 
experimentation—to embolden the policy class to accept the need for 
economic, political and ethical choice and improve the tools by which they 
can come to that challenge free of unhelpful professional habits and 
deformations.‖243  
The aim of this Article has been to build on the framework already 
sketched by Trubek and Kennedy, and bring focus to the possibility of ―a 
new moment‖ in the law and development field. For some, these novel 
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characteristics may have something to do with an evolving triumph of 
pragmatism and experimentalism over formalism and ideology, of Obama 
over Bush. I think that the identification of a new pragmatic 
experimentalism on the scene is precisely right, and that pragmatism has a 
great deal to do with the new turn in development policy. However, my 
unfortunate suspicion is that we may have less reason to welcome the 
―new moment‖ once we take a closer look at the sort of pragmatism that 
seems to have captured the spirit of the time.
244
  
In doing so, I adopted the same intellectual history of law that has 
played a role in Trubek and Kennedy‘s work—that of Duncan Kennedy‘s 
essay ―Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought.‖245 In that work, 
Kennedy argues that since the US Civil War, lawyers, judges, and 
policymakers in the United States have participated in three phases of a 
global legal consciousness. Each phase globalized, Kennedy explains, at 
times representing the movement of legal ideas from Europe to the US, 
and at others in the reverse. The first globalization involved the 
transmission of ―classical‖ ideas from Europe to the US, the second 
globalization involved more of a back and forth cross-Atlantic movement 
of ―social‖ legal ideas, and the third globalization, in which we are now 
living, holds the United States at the core. What is helpful to understand 
about the map is that not everything that is happening now is necessarily 
indigenous to the contemporary legal thought of the third globalization. 
It‘s better to think of contemporary legal thought as a style or aesthetic 
than a period of time, such that we may very well see contemporary jurists 
operating in the outdated mode of, say, classical legal thought, just as 
contemporary musicians might perform in a style that was for more 
popular a hundred years ago. 
This Article has sought to shed light on the question of whether the 
field of law and development has entered a new moment—a phase which 
can be meaningfully distinguished from the modern liberalism and 
neoliberalism of prior times. The argument has been in the affirmative, 
and following the lead of Duncan Kennedy, David Trubek, and David 
Kennedy, it has been in agreement with the idea that contemporary legal 
thought is comprised of contrasting tendencies. Where the present 
discussion has veered off has been in its suggestion that contemporary 
legal thought is housed in a pragmatic structure that enables and maintains 
minimalist commitments to neoformalism and balancing techniques, 
 
 
 244. My thinking here follows the poststructuralist approach of Arturo Escobar in ENCOUNTERING 
DEVELOPMENT 42 (1995). 
 245. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, supra note 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss1/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEVELOPMENT & THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 59 
 
 
 
 
instead of being emancipated by a pragmatism that rebukes them. This 
enabling pragmatism is of a specific kind, however, and it boasts an 
eclecticism and minimalism drawn from an apparently endless wellspring 
of ―everyday‖ ―can-do attitudes‖ about ―getting the job done.‖ This is a 
vulgar, everyday pragmatism, and it provides the basis for the dominant 
legal pragmatism of today. 
If contemporary legal thought is going to witness a new moment of a 
more hopeful kind, it will have to shake itself out of the problem-solving 
ethos of eclectic pragmatism. This will be a tall order, essentially requiring 
the will to terminate the interminable circles of liberal legalism and its 
recycled images of market and state. Perhaps experimentalism is the way 
to go, and just as experimentalists would have it, we‘ll never really know 
for sure. All we can do is try, and then keep trying.  
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